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Abstract
We present Clio, an information flow control (IFC) system that
transparently incorporates cryptography to enforce confidentiality
and integrity policies on untrusted storage. Clio insulates develop-
ers from explicitly manipulating keys and cryptographic primitives
by leveraging the policy language of the IFC system to automati-
cally use the appropriate keys and correct cryptographic operations.
We prove that Clio is secure with a novel proof technique that is
based on a proof style from cryptography together with standard
programming languages results. We present a prototypeClio imple-
mentation and a case study that demonstrates Clio’s practicality.
Keywords
information-flow control, cryptography
1 Introduction
Cryptography is critical for applications that securely store and
transmit data. It enables the authentication of remote hosts, au-
thorization of privileged operations, and the preservation of confi-
dentiality and integrity of data. However, applying cryptography
is a subtle task, often involving setting up configuration options
and low-level details that users must get right; even small mistakes
can lead to major vulnerabilities [37, 48]. A common approach to
address this problem is to raise the level of abstraction. For exam-
ple, many libraries provide high-level interfaces for establishing
TLS [19] network connections (e.g., OpenSSL1) that are very similar
to the interfaces for establishing unencrypted connections. These
libraries are useful (and popular) because they abstract many con-
figuration details, but they also make several assumptions about
certificate authorities, valid protocols, and client authentication.
Due in part to these assumptions, the interfaces are designed for
experienced cryptography programmers and as a result can be used
incorrectly by non-experts in spite of their high level of abstrac-
tion [61]. Indeed, crypto library misuse is a more prevelant security
issue than Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL Injection [57].
Information flow control (IFC) is an attractive approach to build-
ing secure applications because it addresses some of these issues.
∗The conference version of this paper appears in CCS 2017 [59].
†Work done while author was at Harvard University.
1https://www.openssl.org/
There has been extensive work in developing expressive informa-
tion flow policy languages [3, 39, 53] that help clarify a program-
mer’s intent. Furthermore, many semantic guarantees offered by
IFC languages are inherently compositional from a security point
of view [24, 64]. However, existing IFC languages (e.g., [18, 28, 41,
47, 54, 55, 63]) generally assume that critical components of the sys-
tem, such as persistent storage, are trustworthy—the components
must enforce the policies specified by the language abstraction.
This assumption makes most IFC systems a poor fit for many of
the use-cases that cryptographic mechanisms are designed for.
It is tempting to extend IFC guarantees to work with untrustwor-
thy data storage by simply “plugging-in” cryptography. However,
the task is not simple: the threat model of an IFC system extended
with cryptography differs from both the standard cryptographic
threat models and from standard IFC threat models. Unlike most
IFC security models, an attacker in this scenario may have low-level
abilities to access signatures and ciphertexts of sensitive data, and
the ability to deny access to data by corrupting it (e.g., flipping bits
in ciphertexts).
Attackers also have indirect access to the private cryptographic
keys through the trusted runtime. An attacker may craft and run
programs that have access to the system’s cryptographic keys in
order to trick the system into inappropriately decrypting or sign-
ing information. Cryptographic security models often account for
the high-level actions of attackers using oracles that mediate what
information an active attacker can learn through interactions with
the cryptosystem. These oracles abstractly represent implemen-
tation artifacts that could be used by the attacker to distinguish
ciphertexts. Ensuring that an actual implementation constrains its
behavior to that modeled by an oracle is typically left to developers.
An attacker’s actual interactions with a system often extend
beyond the semantics of specific cryptographic primitives and into
application-specific runtime behavior such as how a server responds
when a message fails to decrypt or a signature cannot be verified. If
an attacker can distinguish this behavior, it may provide them with
information about secrets. Building real implementations that pro-
vide no additional information to attackers beyond that permitted
by the security model can be very challenging.
Therefore, to give developers better tools for building secure
applications, we need to ensure that system security is not violated
by combining attackers’ low-level abilities and their ability to craft
their own programs. This requires extending the attacker’s power
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beyond that typically considered by IFC models, and representing
the attacker’s interactions with the system more precisely than
typical cryptographic security models.
This paper presents Clio, a programming language that recon-
ciles IFC and cryptography models to provide guarantees on both
ephemeral data within Clio applications and persistent data on
an untrusted key-value store. Clio extends the IFC-tool LIO [54]
with store and fetch operations for interacting with a persistent key-
value store. Like LIO, Clio expresses confidentiality and integrity
requirements using security labels: flows of information are con-
trolled throughout the execution of programs to ensure the policies
represented by the labels are enforced. Clio encrypts and signs data
as it leaves the Clio runtime, and decrypts and verifies as it enters
the system. These operations are done automatically according to
the security labels—thus avoiding both the mishandling of sensitive
data and the misuse of cryptographic mechanisms. Because the
behavior of the system is fully specified by the semantics of the
Clio language, an attacker’s interactions with the system can be
characterized precisely. This results in a strong connection between
the power of the attacker in our formal security model and in actual
Clio programs.
Clio transparently maps security labels to cryptographic keys
and leverages the underlying IFC mechanisms to ensure that keys
are not misused within the program. Since we consider attackers
capable of denying access to information by corrupting data, Clio
extends LIO labels with an availability policy that tracks who can
deny access to information (i.e., who may corrupt the data).
Figure 1 presents an overview of the Clio threat model. At a
high-level, a Clio program may be a malicious program written by
the attacker. All interactions between the runtime and the store are
visible to the attacker. Only the (trusted) Clio runtime has access
to the keys used to protect information from the attacker, but the
attacker may have access to other “low” keys. The Clio runtime
never exposes keys directly to program code: they are only used
implicitly to protect or verify data as it leaves or enters the Clio
runtime.
Attackers may also perform low-level fetch and store opera-
tions directly on the key-value store. Using these low-level oper-
ations, an attacker may corrupt ciphertexts to make them invalid
even when it does not possess the signing keys to make valid mod-
ifications. We treat these actions as attacks on the availability of
data, rather than on its integrity. A low-availability store is vul-
nerable to availability attacks, and thus should be prevented from
storing data that requires high-availability. Clio’s information flow
control mechanisms mediate the attacker’s ability to discover new
information or modify signed values by interacting with a Clio
program through fetchs and stores to a Clio store.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• A formalization of the ideal semantics of Clio, which models
its security without cryptography, and a real semantics, which
enforces security cryptographically.
• A novel proof technique that combines standard programming
language and cryptographic proof techniques. Using this ap-
proach, we characterize the interaction between the high-level
security guarantees provided by information flow control and the
low-level guarantees offered by the cryptographic mechanisms.
CLIO 
programs
get/put
operations
public keys,
low private keys 
public keys,
all private keys 
get/put
operations
CLIO 
runtime Store
Attacker
Figure 1: Clio threat model. Attackers write Clio programs, read
from and write to the store, and observe the runtime’s interactions.
• For confidentiality, we have formalized these guarantees as chosen-
term attack (CTA) security, an extension of chosen-plaintext at-
tack (CPA) security to systems where an attacker may choose
arbitrary Clio programs that encrypt and decrypt information
through the Clio runtime. Though CTA security is predicated
on the relatively weak guarantees of CPA crypto primitives, CTA
security provides stronger guarantees since it applies to the end-
to-end flow of information through the system, including the
interactions an active, adaptive attacker might use to distinguish
ciphertexts.
• For integrity, we have defined leveraged existential forgery, an
extension of existential forgery to systems where an attacker may
choose and execute a program to produce signed values.
• A prototype Clio implementation in the form of a Haskell library
extending LIO. Our prototype system employs the DC labels
model [53], previously used in practical systems (e.g., Hails [23]
and COWL [55]). Our implementation extends DC-labels with
an availability component, which may be applicable to these
existing systems as well.
Our approach uses a computational model of cryptography. How-
ever, we do not rely on a formal definition of computational nonin-
terference [30]. Instead, we phrase security in terms of an adversary-
based game with a definition much closer to standard cryptographic
definitions of security such as CPA security [43]. This approach
helps to model an active adversary on the store, something that com-
putational noninterference can not easily capture. Furthermore, we
incorporate the semantics of Clio programs and potential attacks
against them into the security model. This approach captures the
power of the attacker more precisely than cryptographic models for
active attackers like chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security [43].
Our CTA model applies a game-based definition of security in
a language setting and is a novel aspect of this work. Computa-
tional noninterference and related approaches consider attackers
that can only provide different secret inputs to the program. Thus
a key contribution of our work is capturing the abilities of an ac-
tive attacker (that can both supply code to execute and directly
manipulate the store) in a crypto-style game that goes beyond CPA
security and standard IFC guarantees (noninterference, including
computational noninterference). Although our results are specific
2
to Clio, we expect our approach to be useful in proving the security
of cryptographic extensions of other information flow languages.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces LIO and Section 3 describes the extensions to it in order to
interact with an untrusted store. Section 4 describes the computa-
tional model of Clio with cryptography, and Section 5 shows the
model’s formal security properties. Section 6 describes the proto-
type implementation of Clio along with a case study. And finally
Section 7 discusses related work. and Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
In this section, we describe the programming model of Clio. Clio
is based on LIO [54], a dynamic IFC library implemented in Haskell.
LIO uses Haskell features to control how sensitive information is
used and to restrict I/O side-effects. In particular, it implements an
embedded language and a runtime monitor based on the notion of
a monad, an abstract data type that represents sequences of actions
(also known as computations) that may perform side-effects. The
basic interface of a monad consists in the fundamental operations
return and (≫=) (read as “bind”). The expression return x denotes
a computation that returns the value denoted by x , performing no
side-effects. The function (≫=) is used to sequence computations.
Specifically, t ≫= λx .t ′ takes the result produced by t and applies
function λx .t ′ to it (which allows computation t ′ to depend on the
value produced by t ). In order to be useful, monads are usually
extended with additional primitive operations to selectively allow
the desired side-effects. The LIO monad is a specific instance of this
pattern equipped with IFC-aware operations that enforce security.
LIO, like many dynamic IFC approaches (e.g., [14, 46, 65]), em-
ploys a floating label. Security concerns are represented by labels
which form a lattice, a partially-ordered (⊑) set with least upper
bounds (⊔) and greatest lower bounds (⊓). A runtime monitor main-
tains as part of its state a distinguished label lcur known as the cur-
rent label. The current label is similar to the program counter (pc)
label of static IFC systems (e.g., [41, 49]): it restricts side-effects in
the current computation that may compromise the confidentiality
or integrity of data. For example, a computation whose current label
is secret cannot write to a public location. LIO operations adjust
this label when sensitive information enters the program and use
it to validate (or reject) outgoing flows.
When an LIO computation with current label lcur observes an
entity with label l , its current label is increased (if necessary) to the
least upper bound of the two labels, written lcur⊔l . Thus, the current
label “floats up” in the security lattice, so that it is always an upper
bound on the security levels of information in the computation.
Similarly, before performing a side-effect visible to label l , LIO
ensures the current label flows to l (lcur ⊑ l ).
Once the current label within a given computation is raised,
it can never be lowered. This can be very restrictive, since, for
example, as soon as confidential data is accessed by a computation,
the computation will be unable to output any public data. To address
this limitation, the toLabeled operation allows evaluation of an
LIO computationm in a separate compartment: toLabeled l m will
run m to completion, and produce a labeled value ‹v : l›, where
v is the result of computationm, and l is an over-approximation
of the final current label ofm. Note that the current label of the
Ground Value: v F true | false | () | l | (v,v)
Value: v F v | (v,v) | x | λx .t | tCLIO | ‹v :l›
Term: t F v | (t , t) | t t | fix t | if t then t else t
| t1 ⊔ t2 | t1 ⊓ t2 | t1 ⊑ t2
| return t | t ≫= t
| label t t | labelOf t | unlabel t
| getLabel | getClearance | lowerClearance t
| toLabeled t t | ll {l t }
| store t t | fetch τ t t
Ground Type: τ F Bool | () | Label | (τ ,τ )
Type: τ F τ | (τ ,τ ) | τ → τ | CLIO τ | Labeled τ
Figure 2: Syntax for Clio values, terms, and types.
enclosing computation is not affected by executing toLabeled l m.
In general, given a labeled value ‹v :l›, label l is an upper bound on
the information conveyed by v . Labeled values can also be created
from raw values using operation label, and a labeled value can
be read into the current scope with operation unlabel. Creating a
labeled value with label l can be regarded as writing into a channel
at security level l . Similarly, observing (i.e., unlabeling) a labeled
value at l is analogous to reading from a channel at l .
LIO security guarantees. LIO provides a termination-insensitive
noninterference-based security guarantee [24]. Intuitively, if a pro-
gram is noninterfering with respect to confidentiality, then the
public outputs of a program reveal nothing about the confidential
inputs. More precisely, an attacker A that can observe inputs and
outputs with confidentiality label at most lA learns nothing about
any input to the program with label l such that l @ lA . Similarly,
a program is noninterfering for integrity if an attacker that can
control untrusted inputs cannot influence trusted outputs.
2.1 Clio
Clio calculus. Clio is formalized as a typed λ-calculus with call-
by-name evaluation, in the same style as LIO [54]. Figure 2 gives
the syntax of Clio values, terms, and types. In addition to standard
λ-calculus features, Clio includes several security-related exten-
sions that mirror those in LIO, and two operations for interacting
with the key-value store, namely store and fetch. As those primi-
tives have nontrivial semantics that involve the external storage,
we defer their discussion to Section 3. Security labels have type
Label and labeled values have type Labeled τ . Computation on
labeled values occur in the CLIO monad using the return and
(≫=) monadic operators. The nonterminals tCLIO and ll ′{l
′′
t } are
only generated by intermediate reduction steps and are not valid
source-level syntax. For convenience, we also distinguish values
that can be easily serialized as ground values, v . Ground values are
all values except functions and Clio computations. To facilitate our
extension of LIO with cryptography, we require labeled values to
contain only ground values.
3
LabelOf
⟨lcur, lclr | labelOf (‹t :l1›)⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | l⟩
Return
⟨lcur, lclr | return t⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | tCLIO⟩
Bind
⟨lcur, lclr | t1CLIO ≫= t2⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | (t2 t1)⟩
Label
lcur ⊑ l1 l1 ⊑ lclr
⟨lcur, lclr | label l1 v⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | return (‹v :l1›)⟩
Unlabel
lcur ⊔ l1 = l2 l2 ⊑ lclr
⟨lcur, lclr | unlabel (‹t2 :l1›)⟩ −→ ⟨l2, lclr | return t2⟩
ToLabeled
lcur ⊑ l1 l1 ⊑ lclr
⟨lcur, lclr | toLabeled l1 t⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | lcurlclr {
l1 t }⟩
Reset
lcur ⊑ l2
⟨lcur, lclr | l1l3 {
l2 tCLIO }⟩ −→ ⟨l1, l3 | label l2 t⟩
Figure 3: Clio language semantics (selected rules).
Static type checking is performed in the standard way. We elide
the typing rules ⊢ t : τ since they are mostly standard2. LIO enforces
information flow control dynamically, so it does not rely on its type
system to provide security guarantees.
The semantics is given by a small-step reduction relation −→
over Clio configurations (Figure 3)3. Configurations are of the form
⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩, where lcur is the current label and t is the Clio term
being evaluated. Label lclr is the current clearance and is an upper
bound on the current label lcur. The clearance allows a programmer
to specify an upper bound for information that a computation is
allowed to access. We write c −→ c ′ to express that configuration
c can take a reduction step to configuration c ′. We define −→∗
as the reflexive and transitive closure of −→. Given configuration
c = ⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩ we write PC(c) for lcur, the current label of c .
Rules return and bind encode the core monadic operations. The
intermediate value tCLIO is used to represent a Clio computation
which produces the term t , without any further effects on the con-
figuration. In rule label, the operation label l v returns a labeled
value with label l holding v (‹v :l›), provided that the current label
flows to l (lcur ⊑ l) and l flows to the current clearance (l ⊑ lclr).
Note that we force the second argument to be a ground value, i.e.
it should be fully normalized. Rule unlabel expresses that, given a
labeled value lv with label l , the operation unlabel lv returns the
value stored in lv and updates the current label to lcur⊔l , to capture
the fact that a value with label l has been read, provided that this
new label flows to the current clearance (l ⊑ lclr). The operations
getLabel and getClearance can be used to retrieve the current label
and clearance respectively.
Rules toLabeled and reset deserve special attention. To evalu-
ate toLabeled l1 t , we first check that l1 is a valid target label
(lcur ⊑ l1 ⊑ lclr) and then wrap t in a compartment using the
special syntactic form lcurlclr {
l1 t }, recording the current label and
2Complete definitions given in Appendix A.3.
3The rest can be found in Appendix A.4.
clearance at the time of entering toLabeled and the target label of
the operation, l1. Evaluation proceeds by reducing t in the context of
the compartment to a value of the form t1CLIO. Next, the rule reset
evaluates the term lcurlclr {
l1 t1CLIO }, first checking that the current
label flows to the target of the current toLabeled (lcur ⊑ l2). Finally,
the compartment is replaced by a normal label operation and the
current label and clearance are restored to their saved values.
DC Labels. LIO is parametric in the label format, but for the
purposes of this paper in Clio we use DC labels [53] with three
components to model confidentiality, integrity, and availability poli-
cies. A label ⟨lc , li , la⟩ represents a policy with confidentiality lc ,
integrity li , and availability la . Information labeled with ⟨lc , li , la⟩
can be read by lc , is vouched for by li , and is hosted by la . We
write C(l), I(l), A(l) for the confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity components of l , respectively. Each component is a conjunction
of disjunctions of principal names, i.e., a formula in conjunctive
normal form. A disjunction A∨ B in the confidentiality component
means that either A or B can read the data; in the integrity com-
ponent, it means that one of A or B vouch for the data, but none
of them take sole responsibility; in terms of availability, it means
that one of A or B can deny access to the data. Conjunctions A ∧ B
mean that only A and B together can read the data (confidentiality),
that they jointly vouch for the data (integrity), or that they can
jointly deny access to the data (availability). Data may flow between
differently labeled entities, but only those with more restrictive poli-
cies: those readable, vouched for, or hosted by fewer entities. A
label ⟨lc , li , la⟩ can flow to any label where the confidentiality com-
ponent is at least as sensitive than lc , the integrity component is
no more trustworthy than li , and the availability is no more than
la , i.e. l1 ⊑ l2 if and only if C(l2) =⇒ C(l1), I(l1) =⇒ I(l2), and
A(l1) =⇒ A(l2). We use logical implication because it matches
the intuitive meaning of disjunctions and conjunctions, e.g., data
readable by A ∨ B is less confidential than data readable only by
A, and data vouched for by A ∧ B is more trustworthy than data
vouched for only by A. In the rest of the paper, we consider only
Clio computations that work on labels of this form.
3 Interacting with an Untrusted Store
Clio extends LIO with a key-value store. The language is extended
with two new commands: store tk tv puts a labeled value tv in the
store indexed by key tk ; fetch τ tk tv command fetches the entry
with key tk and if it cannot be fetched, returns the labeled value
tv . In both commands, tk must evaluate to a ground value and the
labeled value tv must evaluate to a labeled ground value with type
τ .
Semantics for fetch and store are shown in Figure 4. We modify
the semantics to be a labeled transition system, where step relation
α−→ is annotated with store events α . Store event α is one of:
• skip (representing no interaction with the store, i.e., an internal
step; we typically elide skip for clarity),
• put ‹v :l› at vk (representing putting a labeled ground value
‹v :l› indexed by vk ),
• got τ ‹v :l› at vk (representing reading a labeled value from the
store indexed by vk ), or
• nothing-at vk representing no value is indexed by vk .
4
Store
lcur ⊑ ℓ lcur ⊑ l1 α = put ‹v :l1› at vk
⟨lcur, lclr | store vk ‹v :l1›⟩
α−→ ⟨lcur, lclr | return ()⟩
Fetch-Valid
A(ℓ) ⊑A A(ld )
α = got τ ‹v :l› at vk l ⊑ ld
⟨lcur, lclr | fetch τ vk ‹vd :ld ›⟩
α−→ ⟨lcur, lclr | return ‹v :ld ›⟩
Fetch-Invalid
A(ℓ) ⊑A A(ld )
(α = nothing-at vk ) or (α = got τ ‹v :l› at vk and l ̸⊑ ld )
⟨lcur, lclr | fetch τ vk ‹vd :ld ›⟩
α−→ ⟨lcur, lclr | return ‹vd :ld ›⟩
Figure 4: Clio language semantics (store and fetch rules).
Labeling transitions with store events allows us to cleanly fac-
tor out the implementation of the store, enabling us to easily use
either an idealized (non-cryptographic) store, or a store that uses
cryptography to help enforce security guarantees. We describe the
semantics of store events in both these settings later.
We associate a label ℓ with the store. Intuitively, store level
ℓ describes how trusted the store is: it represents the inherent
protections provided by the store and the inherent trust by the store
in Clio. For example, the store may be behind an organization’s
firewall so data is accessible only to organization members due to
an external access control mechanism (i.e., the firewall), so Clio
can safely store the organization’s information there. Dually, there
may be integrity requirements that Clio is trusted to uphold when
writing to the store. For example, the store may be used as part of a
larger system that uses the store to perform important operations
(e.g., ship customer orders). Thus the integrity component of the
store label is a bound on the untrustworthiness of information that
Clio should write to the store (e.g., Clio should not put unendorsed
shipping requests in the store). The availability component of the
store label specifies a bound onwho is able to corrupt information in
the store and thus make it unavailable. (Note that we are concerned
with information availability rather than system availability.) In
general, this would describe all the principals who have direct and
indirect write-access to the store.
Rule Store (Figure 3) is used to put a labeled value ‹v : l› in the
store, indexed by key vk . We require that the current label lcur is
bounded above by store level ℓ. In terms of confidentiality, this
means that any information that may be revealed by performing
the store operation (i.e., lcur) is permitted to be learned by users
of the store. For integrity, the decision to place this value in the
store (possibly overwriting a previous value) should not be influ-
enced by information below the integrity requirements of the store.
For availability, the information should not be derived from less
available sources than the store’s availability level.
Additionally, we require the current label to flow to l , the label
of the value that is being stored (i.e., lcur ⊑ l1). Intuitively, this is
because an entity that learns the labeled value also learns that the
labeled value was put in the store. Current label lcur is an upper
bound on the information that led to the decision to perform the
store, and l1 bounds who may learn the labeled value.
For command fetch τ vk ‹vd :ld ›, labeled value ‹vd : ld › serves
double duty. First, if the store cannot return a suitable value (e.g., be-
cause there is no value indexed by keyvk , or because cryptographic
signature verification fails), then the fetch command evaluates to
the default labeled value ‹vd : ld › (which might be an error value
or a suitable default). Second, label ld specifies an upper bound on
the label of any value that may be returned: if the store wants to
return a labeled value ‹v :l› where l ̸⊑ ld , then the fetch command
evaluates to ‹vd :ld › instead. This allows programmers to specify
bounds on information they are willing to read from the store.
Rule Fetch-Valid is used when a labeled value is successfully
fetched from the store. Store event got τ ‹v :l› at vk indicates that
the store was able to return labeled value ‹v :l› indexed by the key
vk . Rule Fetch-Invalid is used when a labeled value cannot be found
indexed at the index requested or it does not safely flow to the
default labeled value (i.e., it is too secret, too untrustworthy or not
available enough), and causes the fetch to evaluate to the specified
default labeled value. Since the label of the default value ld will be
used for the label of the fetched value in general, the availability of
the store level should be bounded above by the availabiltiy of the
label of the default value (i.e., A(ℓ) ⊑A A(ld )) in both rules, as the
label of the fetched value should reflect the fact that anyone from
the store could have corrupted the value.
3.1 Ideal Store Behavior
We informally describe the ideal behavior of an untrusted store
from the perspective of a Clio program.4 The ideal store semantics
provides a specification of the behavior that a real implementation
should strive for, and allows the programmer to focus on function-
ality and security properties of the store rather than the details of
cryptographic enforcement of labeled values. In Section 4 we de-
scribe how we use cryptography to achieve this ideal specification.
We use a small-step relation ⟨c,σ ⟩ ⇝ ⟨c ′,σ ′⟩ where ⟨c,σ ⟩ and
⟨c ′,σ ′⟩ are pairs of a Clio configuration c and an ideal store σ . An
ideal store σ maps ground values vk to labeled ground values ‹v :l›.
If a store doesn’t contain a mapping for an index vk , we represent
that as mapping it to the distinguished value ⊥.
Store events are used to communicate with the store. When a
put ‹v :l› at vk event is emitted, the store is updated appropri-
ately. When the Clio computation issues a fetch command, the
store provides the appropriate event (i.e., either provides event
nothing-at vk or event got τ ‹v :l› at vk for an appropriate labeled
value ‹v :l›). For Clio computation steps that do not interact with
the store, store event skip is emitted, and the store is not updated.
3.2 Non-Clio Interaction: Threat Model
We assume that programs other than Clio computations may inter-
act with the store and may try to actively or passively subvert the
security of Clio programs. Our threat model for these adversarial
programs is as follows (and uses store level ℓ to characterize some
of the adversaries’ abilities).
• All indices of the key-value store are public information, and an
adversary can probe any index of the store and thus notice any
and all updates to the store.
4Complete formal definitions in Appendix A.6.
5
Low-Step
⟨c, I (σ )⟩ ⇝ ⟨c ′,σ ′⟩
PC(c) ⊑ ℓ PC(c ′) ⊑ ℓ
(⟨c,σ ⟩, I )↷ ⟨c ′,σ ′⟩
Low-to-High-to-Low-Step
⟨c, I (σ )⟩ ⇝ ⟨c0,σ0⟩
⟨c0,σ0⟩ ⇝ ...⇝ ⟨c j ,σj ⟩
∀0≤i<j . PC(ci ) ̸⊑ ℓ PC(c j ) ⊑ ℓ
(⟨c,σ ⟩, I )↷ ⟨c j ,σj ⟩
I F I · I | I
I F skip = λσ .σ
| put ‹v :l1› at v ′ = λσ . σ [v ′ 7→ ‹v :l1›] s.t. I(ℓ) ⊑I I(l1)
| corrupt v1, ...vn = λσ .σ [v1 7→ ⊥; ... vn 7→ ⊥]
Figure 5: Adversary Interactions and Low Steps
• An adversary can read labeled values ‹v :l1› in the store where
the confidentiality level of label l1 is at least as confidential as
the store level ℓ (i.e., C(l1) ⊑C C(ℓ)).
• An adversary can put labeled values ‹v : l1› in the store (with
arbitrary ground value index vk ) provided the integrity level of
store level ℓ is at least as trustworthy as the integrity of label l1
(i.e., I(ℓ) ⊑I I(l1)).
An adversary can adaptively interact with the store. That is, the
behavior of the adversary may depend upon (possibly probabilisti-
cally) changes the adversary detects or values in the store.
We make the following restrictions on adversaries.
• The adversary does not have access to timing information. That
is, it cannot observe the time between updates to the store. We
defer to orthorgonal techniques to mitigate the impact of timing
channels [8]. For example, Clio could generate store events on a
fixed schedule.
• The adversary cannot observe termination of a Clio program,
including abnormal termination due to a failed label check. This
assumption can be satisfied by requiring that all Clio programs
do not diverge and are checked to ensure normal termination,
e.g., by requiring getLabel checks on the label of a labeled value
before unlabeling it. Static program analysis can ensure these
conditions, and in the rest of the paper we consider only Clio
programs that terminate normally.
Note that even though the adversary might have compromised
the Clio program, it can only interact with it at runtime through
the store. The adversary does not automatically learn everything
that the program learns, because data in the Clio runtime is still
subject to Clio semantics and the IFC enforcement, which might
prevent exfiltration to the store. The Clio semantics thus gives a
more precise characterization of the power of the adversary. Rather
than proving the security in the presence of a decryption oracle (e.g.,
CCA or CCA-2 [43]), the Clio runtime prevents system interactions
from being used as a decryption oracle, by construction.
We formally model the non-Clio interactions with the store
using sequences of adversary interactions I , given in Figure 5. Ad-
versary interactions are skip, put ‹v :l1› at v ′ and corrupt v1, ...vn ,
which, respectively: do nothing; put a labeled value in the store;
and delete the mappings for entries at indices v1 to vn . For storing
labeled values, we restrict the integrity of the labeled value stored
by non-Clio interactions to be at most at the store level. Sequences
of interactions I1 · ... · In are notated as I .
To model the adversary actively updating the store, we define a
step semantics↷ that includes adversary interactions I . We restrict
interactions to occur only at low steps, i.e., when the current label
of the Clio computation is less than or equal to the store level ℓ.
(By contrast, a high step is when the current label can not flow
to ℓ.) This captures the threat model assumption that the attacker
cannot observe timing. Rules Low-Step and Low-To-High-To-Low-Step
in Figure 5 express adversary interactions occurring only at low
steps.
4 Realizing Clio
In this section we describe how Clio uses cryptography to enforce
the policies on the labeled values through a formal model, called
the real Clio store semantics. This model serves as the basis for
establishing strong, formally proven, computational guarantees of
the Clio system. We first describe how DC labels are enforced with
cryptographic mechanisms (Section 4.1), and then describe the real
Clio store semantics (Section 4.2).
4.1 Cryptographic DC Labeled Values
Clio, like many systems, identifies security principals with the
public key of a cryptographic key pair, and associates the authority
to act as a given principal with possession of the corresponding
private key. At a high level, Clio ensures that only those with access
to a principal’s private key can access information confidential to
that principal and vouch for information on behalf of that principal.
Clio tracks key pairs in a keystore. Formally, a keystore is a
mapping P : p 7→ ({0, 1}∗, {0, 1}∗⊥), where p is the principal’s well-
known name, and the pair of bit strings contains the public and
private keys for the principal. In general, the private key for a prin-
cipal may not be known—represented by ⊥—which corresponds to
knowing the identity of a principal, but not possessing its authority.
Keystores are the basis of authority and identity for Clio computa-
tions. We use meta-functions on keystores to describe the authority
of a keystore in terms of DC labels.5 Conceptually, a keystore can
access and vouch for any information for a principal for which it
has the principal’s private key. Meta-function authorityOf(P) re-
turns a label where each component (confidentiality, integrity, and
availability) is the conjunction of all principals for which keystore
P has the private key. We also use the keystore to determine the
starting label of a Clio program Start(P) and the least restrictive
clearance Clr(P), which are, respectively, the most public, trusted,
and available label possible and the most confidential, least trusted,
and least available data that the computation can compute on, given
the keystore’s authority.
Using the principal keystore as a basis for authority and identity
for principals, Clio derives a cryptographic protocol that enforces
the security policies of safe information flows defined by DC labels.
In the DC label model, labels are made up of triples of formulas.
Formulas are conjunctions of categories C1 ∧ ... ∧Cn . Categories
are disjunctions of principals p1 ∨ ... ∨ pn . Any principal in a cat-
egory can read (for confidentiality) and vouch for (for integrity)
information bounded above by the level of the category. We enforce
5Complete definitions for these functions are in Appendix A.8.
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that ability cryptographically by ensuring that only principals in
the category have access to the private key for that category. Clio
achieves this through the use of category keys.
A category key serves as the cryptographic basis of authority
and identity for a category. Category keys are made up of the
following components: a category public key that is readable by all
principals, a category private key that is only readable by members
of the category, and a category key signature that is a signature
on the category public key and category private key to prove the
category key’s authenticity. Category keys are created lazily by
Clio as needed and placed in the store. A category key is created
using a randomized meta-function6 parameterized by the keystore.
The generated category private key is encrypted for each member
of the category separately using each member principal’s public
key. To prevent illegitimate creation of category keys, the encrypted
category private key and category public key are together signed
using the private key of one of the category members.7 When a
category key is created and placed in the store, it can be fetched
by anyone but decrypted only by the members of the category.
When a Clio computation fetches a category key, it verifies the
signature of the category key to ensure that a category member
actually vouches for it.8 (Failing to verify the signature would allow
an adversary to trick a Clio computation into using a category key
that is readable by the adversary.)
A Clio computation encrypts data confidential to a formula
C1 ∧ ... ∧ Cn by chaining the encryptions of the value. It first
encrypts using C1’s category public key and then encrypts the
resulting ciphertext for formula C2 ∧ ... ∧Cn . This form of layered
encryption relies on a canonical ordering of categories; we use a
lexicographic ordering of principals to ensure a canonical ordering
of encryptions and decryptions.
A Clio computation signs data for a formula by signing the
data with each category’s private key and then concatenating the
signatures together. Verification succeeds only if every category
signature can be verified.
Equipped with a mechanism to encrypt and sign data for DC
labels that conceptually respects safe information flows in Clio,
we use this mechanism to serialize and deserialize labeled values
to the store. Given a labeled ground value ‹⟨lc , li , la⟩ :v›, the value
v is signed according to formula li . The value and signature are
encrypted according to formula lc , and the resulting bitstring is the
serialization of the labeled value. Deserialization performs decryp-
tion and then verification. If deserialization fails, then Clio treats
it like a missing entry, and the fetch command that triggered the
deserialization would evaluate to the default labeled value.
Replay Attacks. Unfortunately, using just encryption and signa-
tures does not faithfully implement the ideal store semantics: the
adversary is able to swap entries in the store, or re-use a previous
valid serialization, and thus in a limited way modify high-integrity
6Defined formally in Appendix A.7.
7The Clio runtime ensures that the first time a category key for a given category is
required, it will be because data confidential to the category or vouched for by the
category is being written to the store, and thus the computation has access to at least
one category member’s private key. Note that any computation with the authority of
a category member has the authority of the category.
8“Encrypt-then-sign”issues (e.g., [1]) do not apply here as the threat model (i.e., signed
encrypted messages implying authorship) is different.
labeled values in the store. We prevent these attacks by requiring
that the encryption of the ground value and signature also includes
the index value (i.e., the key used to store the labeled value) and
a version number. The real Clio semantics keeps track of the last
seen version of a labeled value for each index of the store. When a
value is serialized, the version of that index is incremented before
being put in the store. When the value is deserialized the version is
checked to ensure that the version is not before a previously used
version for that index. In a distributed setting, this version counter
could be implemented as a vector clock between Clio computa-
tions to account for concurrent access to the store. However, for
simplicity, we use natural numbers for versions in the real Clio
store semantics.
4.2 Clio Store Semantics
In this section we describe the real Clio store semantics in terms of
a small-step probabilistic relation⇝p . The relation models a step
taken from a real Clio configuration to a real Clio configuration
with probability p. A real Clio configuration is a triple ⟨c,,V⟩
of a Clio configuration c , a distribution of sequences of real inter-
actions with the store , and a version map V. The version map
tracks version numbers for the store to prevent replay attacks, as
described above. For technical reasons, instead of the configuration
representing the key-value store as a map, we use the history of
store interactions (which includes interactions made both by the
Clio computation and the adversary). The sequence of interac-
tions applied to the initial store gives the current store. Because
the real Clio store semantics are probabilistic (due to the use of
a probabilistic cryptosystem and cryptographic-style probabilistic
polynomial-time adversaries), configurations contain distributions
over sequences of store interactions.
Real interactions R (and their sequences R) are defined in Fig-
ure 7 and are similar to interactions with the ideal store. However,
instead of labeled values containing ground values, they contain
bitstrings b (expressing the low-level details of the cryptosystem
and the ability of the adversary to perform bit-level operations).
Additionally, the interaction put ck atC represents storing of a cat-
egory key. These interactions arise from the serialize metafunction,
which may create new category keys. Note that the interaction
put ‹b :l› at vk does not need an integrity side condition (as it
did in the ideal semantics) in the real semantics since there is no
distinction between corruptions and valid store interactions.
We use notation
{| f (X1, ...,Xn ) | X1 ← D1; ... Xn ← Dn |}
to describe the probability distribution over the function f with
inputs of random variables X1, ...,Xn where Xi is distributed ac-
cording to distribution Di for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Figure 6 presents the inference rules for⇝p . Internal steps do
not affect the interactions or versions. For storing (rule Store), the
version of the entry is incremented using the increment function
and the real Clio configuration uses a new distribution of inter-
actions ′ containing the interactions to store the labeled value.
The new distribution contains the original interactions (distributed
according to the original distribution of interactions) along with a
concatenation of labeled ciphertexts and any new category keys
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Internal-Step
c −→ c ′
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝1 ⟨c ′,,V⟩
Store
c
put ‹v : l1› at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′
n = increment(V(vk )) V′ = V[vk 7→ n]
′ = {| put ‹b :l1› at vk · R′ · R
 R ← ;
(R′, ‹b :l1›) ← serializeP (σ , ‹(v,vk ,n) :l1›) |}
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝1 ⟨c ′,′,V′⟩
Fetch-Exists
c
got τ ‹v : l1› at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′ n ≮ V(vk )
(σ ,p) ∈ {| R(∅) | R ←  |} p > 0
‹(v,vk ,n) :l1› = deserializeP (σ ,σ (vk ),τ )
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c,,V⟩
Fetch-Missing
c
nothing-at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′
(σ ,p) ∈ {| R(∅) | R ←  |} p > 0
deserializeP (σ ,σ (vk ),τ ) undefined
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c,,V⟩
Fetch-Replay
c
nothing-at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′ v ′k , vk or n < V(vk )
(σ ,p) ∈ {| R(∅) | R ←  |} p > 0
‹(v,v ′k ,n) :l1› = deserializeP (σ ,σ (vk ),τ )
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c,,V⟩
Figure 6: Real Clio Semantics
(distributed according to the distribution given by serialization func-
tion). Note that the label of the stored value is not encrypted as it
is public information. The configuration steps with probability 1 as
the Store rule will be used for all store operations.
When fetching a labeled value, there are three possible rules that
can be used depending on the current state of the store: Fetch-Exists,
Fetch-Missing, Fetch-Replay. The premise,
(σ ,p) ∈ {| R(∅) | R ←  |}
in each of these rules means that store σ has probability p of being
produced (by drawing interaction sequence R from distribution 
and applying R to the empty store ∅ to give store σ ).
Which rule is used for a fetch operation depends on the state
of the store, and so the transitions may have probability less than
one. Rule Fetch-Exists is used when the sequence of interactions
drawn produces a store that has a serialized labeled value indexed
by vk that can be correctly deserialized and whose version is not
less than the last version seen at this index. Rule Fetch-Missing is
used when the sequence of interactions drawn produces a store
that either does not have an entry indexed by vk , or has an entry
that cannot be correctly deserialized. Finally, Fetch-Replay rule is
used when the sequences of interactions drawn produce a store
where an adversary has attempted to replay an old value: the store
has a labeled value that can be deserialized correctly, but whose
Low-Step
′ = {| RA · R | RA ← A ; R ←  |}
⟨c, ′, V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c′, ′′, V′⟩
PC(c) ⊑ C(ℓ) PC(c′) ⊑ C(ℓ)
(⟨c, , V⟩, A)↷p ⟨c′, ′′, V′⟩
Low-to-High-to-Low-Step
′ = {| RA · R | RA ← A ; R ←  |}
⟨c, ′, V⟩ ⇝p0 ⟨c0, 0, V)⟩
⟨c0, 0, V0 ⟩ ⇝p1 ... ⇝pj ⟨c j , j , Vj ⟩
∀0≤i< j . PC(ci ) ̸⊑ ℓ PC(c j ) ⊑ ℓ p = Π0≤i≤j pi
(⟨c, , V⟩, A)↷p ⟨c j , j , Vj ⟩
Interactions: RF skip = λσ . σ
| put ck at C = λσ . σ [C 7→ ck ]
| put ‹b : l › at vk = λσ . σ [vk 7→ ‹b : l ›]
Strategies: S : → 
stepP
ℓ
(c0, S, 1) =
{( ⟨c1, 1, V1 ⟩, p0 · p1) 
(⟨c0, {(skip, 1)}, Σ0 ⟩, S({(skip, 1)}))↷p1 ⟨c1, 1, V1 ⟩
}
stepP
ℓ
(c0, S, j + 1) =
{( ⟨c2, 2, V2 ⟩, p0 · p1) ( ⟨c1, 1, V1 ⟩, p0) ∈ stepPℓ (c0, S, j);
(⟨c1, 1, V1 ⟩, S(1))↷p1 ⟨c2, 2, V2 ⟩
}
Figure 7: Real Clio Low Step Semantics
recorded index is not the same as the index requested by the Clio
computation or whose version is less than the version last seen.
Similar to the ideal store semantics, we use a low step relation↷p
to model adversary interactions, shown in Figure 7. The low step
relation is also probabilistic as it is based on the probabilistic single
step relation⇝p . Additionally, we use a distribution of sequences
of adversarial interactions A to model an adversary that behaves
probabilistically. In rules Low-Step and Low-To-High-To-Low-Step a new
distribution of interactions, ′ is created by concatenating interac-
tion sequences drawn from the existing distribution of interactions
 and the adversary distribution A. This is analogous to the ap-
plication of adversary interactions to the current store in the ideal
semantics. The rest of the definitions of the rules follow the same
pattern as the ideal Clio low step store semantics.
With the low step relation, we use metafunction step to describe
the distributions of real Clio configurations resulting from taking
j low steps from configuration c0, formally defined in Figure 7. The
step function is parameterized by the keystore P and store level
ℓ. To provide a source of adversary interactions while running the
program, the step function also takes as input a strategy S which
is a function from distributions of interactions to distributions of
interactions, representing the probabilities of interactions an active
adversary would perform. Before each low step, the strategy is
invoked to produce a distribution of interactions that will affect the
store that the Clio computation is using.
Strategy S expresses the ability of the attacker to modify the
store. The attacker chooses S (and t , v0, and v1), and S interacts
with the store during execution. S is a function from (distributions
of) interaction sequences to (distributions of) interaction sequences,
i.e., a function from a history of what has happened to the store
so far to the attacker’s next modifications to the store. Note that
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we do not explicitly model fetching from the store as an adversary
interaction. There is no need for S to fetch values to determine
the next modification to the store since S effectively observes the
entire history of store interactions. At the end of the game when the
adversary continuation (A2) needs to pick v0 or v1, it observes the
history of interactions with the store via the interaction sequence
Rb , and thus does not need to explicitly get or fetch values.
5 Formal Properties
5.1 Indistinguishability
A cryptosystem is semantically secure if, informally, ciphertexts
of messages of equal length are computationally indistinguishable.
Two sequences of probability distributions are computationally
indistinguishable (written {Xn }n ≈ {Yn }n ) if for all non-uniform
probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) algorithms A, Pr[A(x) = 1 | x ← Xn ] − Pr[A(y) = 1 | y ← Yn ] 
is negligible in n [26].
In modern cryptosystems, semantic security is defined as indis-
tinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA) [43].
Definition 5.1 (Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack).
Let the random variable INDb (A,n) denote the output of the ex-
periment, where A is non-uniform ppt, n ∈ , b ∈ {0, 1} :
INDb (A,n) = (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n );
m0,m1,A2 ← A(pk) s.t. |m0 | = |m1 |;
c ← Enc(pk,mb );
Output A2(c)
Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) secure if
for all non-uniform ppt A:{
IND0(A,n)
}
n
≈
{
IND1(A,n)
}
n
This definition of indistinguishability phrases the security of
the cryptosystem in terms of a game where an adversary receives
the public key and then produces two plaintext messages of equal
length. One of the two messages is encrypted and the resulting
ciphertext given to the adversary. The cryptosystem is CPA Se-
cure if no adversary exists that can produce substantially different
distributions of output based on the choice of message. In other
words, no computationally-bounded adversary is able to effectively
distinguish which message was encrypted.
Clio relies on a semantically secure cryptosystem, but this is
insufficient for Clio to protect the confidentiality of secret infor-
mation. This is because CPA Security provides guarantees only for
individually chosen plaintext messages. In contrast, in our setting
we consider terms (i.e., programs) chosen by an adversary. There
are also many principals and as a result many keys in a real system,
so Clio must protect arbitrarily many principals’ information from
the adversary. Additionally, the adversary may already have ac-
cess to some of the keys. Finally, the adversary is active: it can see
interactions with the store and issue new interactions adaptively
while the program is running. It can attempt to leverage a Clio
computation to illegitimately produce a value it should not have,
or could try to trick the Clio system into leaking secret informa-
tion by interacting with the store. Traditionally, these actions of
the adversary are modeled by queries to a decryption oracle, as in
CCA-2 [43]. Here, they are modeled directly by the Clio language
and store semantics.
We chose to formulate a new definition of security that addresses
these concerns, as many previous classical definitions of security
fall short in this setting:
• Noninterference does not permit the use of computationally
secure mechanisms like cryptography.
• CPA security considers only the semantics of the crypto-
graphic algorithms, not the system they are embeddedwithin.
• CCA and CCA2 attempt to model system behavior using
oracles, but the connection between these oracles and an
actual system is too abstract.
In contrast, we chose to employ a computational model of cryptog-
raphy that accurately represents the power of the attacker precisely
using the semantics of the language and interactions with the store.
With these considerations in mind, we define indistinguishability
under a new form of attack: chosen-term attacks (CTA).
Definition 5.2 (Indistinguishability under Chosen-Term Attack).
Let the random variable INDb (P,A, p˜, j,n) denote the output of
the following experiment, where Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec,Sign,Verify),
A is non-uniform ppt, n ∈ , b ∈ {0, 1}:
INDb (P0,A, p˜, j,n) =
P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
t ,v0,v1,S,A2 ← A(pub(P)) such that v0 =Cℓ v1
and ⊢ t : Labeled τ → LIO τ ′
and ⊢ v0 : Labeled τ
and ⊢ v1 : Labeled τ
and ℓ = authorityOf(P0);
⟨c,b ,V′⟩ ← stepPℓ (⟨Start(P),Clr(P) | (t vb )⟩,S, j);
Rb ← b ; Output A2(Rb )
Clio using Π is CTA Secure if for all non-uniform ppt A, j ∈ ,
keystores P, and principals p˜:{
IND0(P,A, p˜, j,n)
}
n
≈
{
IND1(P,A, p˜, j,n)
}
n
The CTA game follows the same structure as the CPA game. In
addition, we allow the adversary to know certain information (by
fixing it in the game), including some part of the keystore (P0), the
set of principals that Clio is protecting (p˜), and the number of low
steps the program takes (j). Cryptosystem Π is used implicitly in
the CTA game to generate keys, encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify9.
In this game setup, Gen(p˜, 1n ) generates a new keystore P ′ con-
taining private keys for each of the principals in p˜, using the un-
derlying cryptosystem’s Gen function for each keypair. Then, the
adversary receives all public keys of the keystore pub(P) and re-
turns three well-typed Clio terms: a function t , and two program
inputs to the function v0 and v1 that must be confidentiality-only
low equivalent =C
ℓ
(i.e., they may differ only on secret values)10. It
also returns a strategy S that models the behavior of the adversary
on the store while the computation is running. Note that the strat-
egy is also polynomial in the security parameter as it is constructed
from a non-uniform polynomial time algorithm. The program t is
9More formally, INDb , A, and the semantics are also parameterized on Π, and the uses
of Gen, Enc, Dec, Sign, Verify should be explicitly taken from the tuple Π though
we elide their explicit usage in our notation for clarity.
10Complete definition of low equivalence is in Appendix A.5.
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run with one of the inputs v0 or v1 for a fixed number of steps j.
The adversary receives the interactions resulting from a run of the
program and needs to use that information to determine which
secret input the program was run with.
Being secure under a chosen-term attack means that the se-
quences of interactions between two low-equivalent programs are
indistinguishable and hence an adversary does not learn any se-
cret information from the store despite actively interacting with
it while the program it chose is running. Note that the adversary
receives the full trace of interactions on the store (including its own
interactions); this gives it enough information to reconstruct the
final state of the store and any intermediate state. For any set of
principals, and any adversary store level, the interactions with the
store contain no efficiently extractable secret information for all
well-typed terminating programs.
Theorem 5.3 (CTA Security). If Π if CPA Secure, then Clio using
Π is CTA Secure.
We prove this theorem in part by induction over the low step
relation↷p , to show that two low equivalent configurations will
produce low equivalent configurations, including computationally
indistinguishable distributions over sequences of interactions. A
subtlety is that we must strengthen the inductive hypothesis to
show that sequences of interactions satisfy a stronger syntactic
relation (rather than being just computationally indistinguishable).
More concretely, the proof follows three high-level steps. First,
we show how a relation ≍ on families of distributions of sequences
of interactions preserves computational indistinguishability. That
is, if 1 ≍ 2 and Π is CPA secure, then 1 ≈ 2. Second, we
show that as two low equivalent configurations step using the low
step relation↷p , low equivalence is preserved and the interactions
they produce satisfy the relation ≍. Third, we show that the use
of the step metafunction on two low equivalent configurations
will produce computationally indistinguishable distributions over
distributions of sequences of interactions. Each step of the proof
relies on the previous step and the first step relies on the underlying
assumptions on the cryptosystem. We now describe each step of
the proof in more detail.
Step 1: Interactions Relation. We consider pairs of arbitrary dis-
tributions of sequences of interactions and show that, if they are
both of a certain syntactic form then they are indistinguishable.
Importantly, the indistinguishability lemmas do not refer to the
Clio store semantics, i.e., they merely describe the form of arbi-
trary interactions that may or may not have come from Clio. The
invariants on pairs of indistinguishable distributions of interactions
implicitly require low equivalence of the programs that generated
them, and low equivalence circularly requires indistinguishable
distributions of interactions. As a result, we describe the lemmas
free from the Clio store semantics to break the circularity.
We progressively define the relation ≍ on a pair of interactions.
Initially, distributions of interactions only contain secret encryp-
tions so that we can appeal to a standard cryptographic argument of
multi-message security. Formally, for all keystores P0, and l1, ..., lk ,
such that C(li ) ⊑C C(authorityOf(P)), and for allm1{1,2} ...mn{1,2}
and all principals p˜, if |mi1 | = |mi2 | for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and Π is CPA
Secure, then
{
put ‹b11 :l
1› at v1 · ... · put ‹bk1 :lk › at vk

P ← Gen(1n );
(pki , ski ) ∈ rnд(P);
bi1 ← Enc(pki ,mi1); 1 ≤ i ≤ k
}
n≍{
put ‹b12 :l
1› at v1 · ... · put ‹bk2 :lk › at vk

P ← Gen(1n );
(pki , ski ) ∈ rnд(P);
bi2 ← Enc(pki ,mi2); 1 ≤ i ≤ k
}
n
Using multi-message security as a basis for indistinguishability,
we then expand the relation to contain readable encryptions (i.e.,
ones for which the adversary has the private key to decrypt) where
the values encrypted are the same. In the complete definiton of ≍,
we expand it to also contain interactions from a strategy, forming
the final relationship on interactions captured by the ≍ relation.
We establish an invariant that must hold between pairs in the
relation in order for them to be indistinguishable. For example,
in the first definition, the lengths of each corresponding message
between the pair must be the same. Each intermediate definition of
≍ is used to show that a ppt can simulate the extra information in
the more generalized definition (thus providing no distinguishing
power). For the first definition of the relation containing only secret
encryptions, a hybrid argument is used similar to showing multi-
message CPA security [43].
Step 2: Preservation of Low Equivalence. We show that as two
low equivalent programs t and t ′ progress, they simultaneously
preserve low equivalence t =C
ℓ
t ′ and the distributions of sequences
of interactions they produce  and ′ are in the relation ≍.
We first show that if c0
α−→ c ′0 and c1
α−→ c ′1 and c0 =Cℓ c1
then c ′0 =
C
ℓ
c ′1. This proof takes advantage of the low equivalence
preservation proofs for LIO in all cases except for the storing and
fetching rules. For store events, since all values being stored will
have the same type (due to type soundness), and will be ground
values, serialized values will have the same message lengths.
We then show that if
(⟨c0,0,V0⟩,)↷p ⟨c ′0,′0,V′0⟩
and
(⟨c1,1,V1⟩,)↷p ⟨c ′1,′1,V′1⟩
and
(c0 =Cℓ c1) ∧ (V0 = V1) ∧ (0 ≍ 1)
then,
(c ′0 =Cℓ c ′1) ∧ (V′0 = V′1) ∧ (′0 ≍ ′1).
The proof on↷p relies on the previous preservation proof on
α−→
and the indistinguishability results on ≍.
Step 3: Indistinguishability of the step metafunction. We show that
the step metafunction preserves low equivalence. More formally,
we show that if c0 =Cℓ c1 and V0 = V1 and 0 ≍ 1 then
{(′0,p0 · ... · p) | ⟨c0,0,V0⟩ ↷p0 ...↷p ⟨c ′0,′0,V′0⟩}n≈
{(′1,p′0 · ... · p′) | ⟨c1,1,V1⟩ ↷p′0 ...↷p′ ⟨c ′1,′1,V′1⟩}n
We prove this by showing that the probabilities of traces taken by
two low equivalent configurations are equal with all but negligible
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( ⟨c1, skip, V0 ⟩, S(skip))
⟨c′′1 , ′1, V′1 ⟩
↷
p
′ 1
⟨c′1, 1, V1 ⟩
↷
p
1
( ⟨c2, skip, V0 ⟩, S(skip))
⟨c′′2 , ′2, V′2 ⟩
↷
p
′ 2
⟨c′2, 2, V2 ⟩
↷
p
2
=C
ℓ
=C
ℓ
=C
ℓ
stepP (c1, S, 1) stepP (c2, S, 1)
Figure 8: Low equivalence is preserved in stepP for two low equiv-
alent configurations c1 and c2 and a strategy S.
probability. As an example, Figure 8 shows graphically how one
step of the trace is handled.We examine the result of stepP (c1,S, 1)
and stepP (c2, S, 1) where c1 =Cℓ c2. (Note that this setup matches
the instantiation of the CTA game where j = 1.) The left rectangle
shows the resulting distribution over distributions of configurations
after one step of the c1 configuration. The right circle shows the
resulting distribution over distributions of configurations after one
step of the c2 configuration. Due to the results from Step 2, we can
reason that c ′1 =
C
ℓ
c ′2 and that c
′′
1 =
C
ℓ
c ′′2 . We can also conclude that
1 ≍ 2 and that ′1 ≍ ′2. The final step of the proof is to show
that the interactions from the resulting two distributions (i.e., the
top circle and bottom circle) are computationally indistinguishable.
That is, we show that p1 is equal to p2 and also p′1 is equal to p
′
2
with all but negligible probability.
5.2 Leveraged Forgery
Whereas in the previous subsection we considered the security of
encryptions, in this case we consider the security of the signatures.
We show that an adversary cannot leverage a Clio computation to
illegitimately produce a signed value.
A digital signature scheme is secure if it is difficult to forge
signatures of messages. Clio requires its digital signature scheme to
be secure against existential forgery under a chosen-message attack,
where the adversary is a non-uniform ppt in the size of the key.
Often stated informally in the literature [25], a digital signature
scheme is secure against existential forgery if no adversary can
succeed in forging the signature of one message, not necessarily of
his choice. Further, the scheme is secure under a chosen-message
attack if the adversary is allowed to ask the signer to sign a number
of messages of the adversary’s choice. The choice of these messages
may depend on previously obtained signatures.
Parallel to CPA and CTA, we adapt the definition of existential
forgery for Clio, which we call leveraged forgery. Intuitively, it
should not be the case that a high integrity signature can be pro-
duced for a value when it is influenced by low integrity information.
We capture this intuition in the following theorem:
Theorem 5.4 (Leveraged Forgery). For a principal p and all
keystores P0, non-uniform ppts A, and labels l1, integers j, j ′, where
ℓ = authorityOf(P0) and I(l1) ⊑I p, if Π is secure against existential
forgery under chosen-message attacks, then
Pr
[
‹b :l1› ∈ ValuesP (R′) and ‹b :l1› < ValuesP (R) P ′ ← Gen({p}, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
t ,S,A2 ← A(pub(P));
⟨c,,V⟩ ← stepP
ℓ
(⟨Start(P),Clr(P) | t⟩,S, j);
R ← ;
t ′,S′ ← A2(R);
⟨c ′,′,V′⟩ ← stepP
ℓ
(⟨Start(P0),Clr(P) | t ′⟩,S′, j);
R′ ← ′
]
Intuitively, the game is structured as follows. First, an adversary
chooses a term t and strategy S that will be run with high integrity
(i.e., Start(P) where P has p’s authority). The adversary sees the
interactions R produced by the high integrity computation (which
in general will include high integrity signatures).
With that information, the adversary constructs a new term
t ′ and new strategy S′ that will be run with low integrity (i.e.,
Start(P0)). Note that the strategy may internally encode high in-
tegrity signatures learned from the high integrity run that it can
place in the store.
The interactions produced by this low integrity computation
should not contain any high integrity signatures (i.e., are signed
by p). The adversary succeeds if it produces a new valid labeled
bitstring ‹b :l1› that did not exist in the first run. In the experiment,
the ValuesP metafunction extracts the set of valid labeled bitstrings
(i.e., can be deserialized correctly) using the parameterized keystore
P to perform the category key decryptions.
The proof of this theorem is in two parts. First we show that the
label of a value being stored by a computation is no more trustwor-
thy than the current label of computation. Second, we show that
the current label never becomes more trustworthy than the starting
label. This means that a low integrity execution (i.e., starting from
⟨Start(P0),Clr(P) | t⟩) cannot produce a high integrity value (i.e.,
a labeled value ‹b :l› such that I(l) ⊑I p).
6 Clio in Practice
6.1 Implementation
We implemented a Clio prototype as a Haskell library, in the same
style as LIO. Building on the LIO code base, the Clio library has an
API for defining and running Clio programs embedded in Haskell.
The library also implements a monitor that oversees the execution
of the program and orchestrates three interdependent tasks:
• Information-flow control Clio executes the usual LIO IFC
enforcement mechanism; in particular, it adjusts the current
label and clearance and checks that information flows according
to the DC labels lattice.
• External key-value store Clio handles all interactions with
the store, realized as an external Redis [29] database. This is
accomplished by using the hedis [44] Haskell library, which
implements a Redis client.
• Cryptography Clio takes care of managing and handling cryp-
tographic keys as well as invoking cryptographic operations
to protect the security of the principals’ data as it crosses the
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system boundary into/back from the untrusted store. Instead of
implementing our own cryptographic primitives, we leverage
the third-party cryptonite [27] library.
Clio uses standard cryptographic schemes to protect the infor-
mation in the store. In particular, for efficiency reasons we use a
hybrid scheme that combines asymmetric cryptography with sym-
metric encryption. The category keys in the store are encrypted and
signed with asymmetric schemes, while the entries stored by Clio
programs are encrypted with symmetric encryption and signed
with an asymmetric signature scheme.
Asymmetric cryptographyWe use cryptonite’s implementation
of RSA, specifically OAEP mode for encryption/decryption and PSS
for signing/verification, both with 1024-bit keys and using SHA256
as a hash. We get around the message size limitation by chunking
the plaintext and encrypting the chunks separately.
Symmetric encryption We use cryptonite’s implementation of
AES, specifically AES256 in Counter (CTR) mode for symmetric
encryption. We use randomized initialization vectors for each en-
cryption. We can use AESNI if the architecture supports it.
Storing and retrieving category keys and labeled values are im-
plemented as discussed in Section 4.1. Appendix C has more details.
Performance LIO-style enforcement mechanisms have performed
adequately in practice, c.f. Hails [23]. We do not expect combining
this with off-the-shelf crypto to introduce more than a constant
time overhead for fetching and writing into the store. The only ad-
ditional concern is the overhead of the category key management
protocol, which is proportional to the number of distinct categories
and their size. Based on the experience obtained by Jif [41], Fab-
ric [33], and Hails, categories are usually small in number and size.
Furthermore, creating category keys incurs a one-time cost which
can be amortized over multiple runs and programs
6.2 Case Study
We have implemented a simple case study to illustrate how our
prototype Clio implementation can be used to build an application.
In this case, we have built a system that models a tax preparation
tool and its interactions with a customer (the taxpayer) and the tax
reporting agency, communicating via a shared untrusted store. We
model these three components as principals C (the customer), P
(the preparer) and IRS (the tax reporting agency). The actions of
each of these three principals are modeled as separate Clio compu-
tations customerCode, preparerCode and irsCode, respectively.
We assume that the store level ℓ restricts writes to the store in
confidential contexts, i.e. ℓ = ⟨⊥,⊤, S⟩, where S is the principal run-
ning as the store. In this scenario, we consider that the principals
involved (C , P and IRS) trust each other and are trying to protect
their data from all other principals in the system (i.e., from S).
The customer C initially makes a record with his/her personal
information, including his/her name, social security number (SSN),
declared income and bank account details, modeled as the type
TaxpayerInfo. Figure 9 shows the customer code on the left, mod-
eled as a function that takes this record as an argument, tpi. The
first step is to label tpi with the label ⟨C ∨ P ∨ IRS,C, S⟩. The con-
fidentiality component is a disjunction of all the principals involved
in the interaction, reflecting the fact that the customer trusts both
the preparer and the IRS with their the data and expects them to
be able to read it. A more realistic example would also keep the
customer’s personal data confidential (i.e. not readable by the IRS
and to some extent by the preparer). However, expressing those
flows would require an IFC system with declassification, a feature
that we have not included in the current version of Clio since it
would introduce additional complexity in our model, and seman-
tic security conditions for such systems are still an active area of
research [4, 7, 13]. Without declassification, if IRS was not in the
label initially, the IFC mechanism would not allow us to release
this data (or anything derived from it) to the IRS at a later time.
The integrity component of this label is just C since this data can
be vouched for only by the customer at this point, while the avail-
ability is trusted since these values haven’t been exposed to (and
potentially corrupted by) the adversary in the store yet. The final
step of the customer is to store their labeled TaxpayerInfo at key
"taxpayer_info" for the preparer to see. Note that in practice this
operation creates a category key for C ∨ P ∨ IRS, stores it in the
database and uses it to encrypt the data, which gets signed by C .
The next step is to run the preparer code, shown in the middle
of Figure 9. The preparer starts by fetching the taxpayer data at
key "taxpayer_info", using a default empty record labeled with
l1 = ⟨P ∨ IRS, P ∨C, S⟩. The entry in the database is labeled dif-
ferently with l2 = ⟨C ∨ P ∨ IRS,C, S⟩, but the operation succeeds
because l2 ⊑ l1 and the availability in l2 is S , i.e., it reflects the
fact that the adversary S might have corrupted this data. The code
then starts a toLabeled sub-computation to securely manipulate
the labeled taxpayer record without raising its current label. In the
subcomputation, we unlabel this labeled record and use function
prepareTaxes to prepare the tax return. Since we are only con-
cerned with the information-flow aspects of the example, we elide
the details of how this function works; our code includes a naive
implementation but it would be straightforward to extend it to
implement a real-world tax preparation operation. The toLabeled
block wraps the result in a labeled value r with label l1, the ar-
gument to toLabeled. Finally, the preparer stores the labeled tax
return r at key "tax_return". Note that this operation would fail
if we had not used toLabeled, since in that case the current label,
raised by the unlabel operation, would not flow to ℓ, the label of
the adversary.
Figure 9 shows the tax agency code on the right. This code
fetches the tax return made by the preparer and stored at key
"tax_return". Analogously to the preparer code, we use the de-
fault value of the fetch operation to specify the target label of the
result, namely ⟨IRS, P ∨C ∨ IRS, S⟩, which in this case is once again
more restrictive than what is stored in the database. Thereafter the
labeled tax return gets unlabeled and the information is audited in
function verifyReturn, which returns a boolean that represents
whether the declaration is correct. In a more realistic application,
this auditing would be performed inside a toLabeled block too, but
since we are not doing any further store operations we let the
current label get raised for simplicity.
These three pieces of code are put together in the main function
of the program, which we elide for brevity. This function simply
generates suitable keystores for the principals involved (using the
Clio library function initializeKeyMapIO) and then runs the
code for each principal using the evalCLIO function.
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customerCode :: TaxpayerInfo → CLIO ()
customerCode tpi = do
info ← label ⟨C ∨ P ∨ IRS, C, S ⟩ tpi
store "taxpayer_info" info
return ()
preparerCode :: CLIO ()
preparerCode = do
default ← label ⟨P ∨ IRS, P ∨C, S ⟩ notFound
info ← fetch τ "taxpayer_info" default
r ← toLabeled ⟨P ∨ IRS, P ∨C, S ⟩ $ do
i ← unlabel info
return (prepareTaxes i)
store "tax_return" r
irsCode :: CLIO Bool
irsCode = do
let l = ⟨IRS, P ∨C ∨ IRS, S ⟩
default ← label l emptyTR
lv ← fetch τ "tax_return" default
tr ← unlabel lv
return (verifyReturn tr)
Figure 9: Customer code (left), Preparer code (middle), and IRS code (right)
7 Related Work
Language-based approaches. Combining cryptography and IFC lan-
guages is not new. The Decentralized Label Model (DLM) [39] has
been extended with cryptographic operations [17, 22, 51, 56]. These
extensions, however, either use only symbolic models of cryptogra-
phy or provide no security properties for their system.
Models for secure declassification are an active area of research
in the IFC community (e.g., [8, 15, 40, 60]). It is less clear, though,
how such models compose with cryptographic attacker models.
Exploring the interactions between declassification and cryptogra-
phy is very interesting, but a rigorous treatment of it is beyond the
scope of this work.
Cryptographically-masked flows [5] account for covert infor-
mation-flow channels due to the cryptosystem (e.g., an observer
may distinguish different ciphertexts for the same message). How-
ever, this approach ignores the probability distributions for cipher-
texts, which might compromise security in some scenarios [36].
Laud [31] establishes conditions under which secure programs with
cryptographically-masked flows satisfy computational noninterfer-
ence [30]. Fournet and Rezk [21] describe a language that directly
embeds cryptographic primitives and provide a language-based
model of correctness, where cryptographic games are encoded in
the language itself so that security can range from symbolic cor-
rectness to computational noninterference.
Information-flow availability has not been extensively studied. Li
et al. [32] discuss the relationship between availability and integrity
and state a (termination- and progress-insensitive) noninterference
property for availability. Zheng and Myers [66] extend the DLM
with availability policies, which express which principals are trusted
to make data available. In their setting, availability is, in essence, the
integrity of progress [6]: low-integrity inputs should not affect the
availability of high-availability outputs. In our work, availability
tracks the successful verification of signatures and decryption of
ciphertexts, and has analogies with Zheng and Myers’ approach.
The problem of conducting proofs of trace-based properties of
languages with access to cryptographic operations in a computa-
tional setting has been studied before. CoSP [10] is a framework
for writing computational soundness proofs of symbolic models.
Their approach abstracts details such as message scheduling and
corruption models and allows for proofs of preservation of trace
properties to be developed in a modular fashion.
Cryptographic approaches. There is much work on how to map
principals and access policies to cryptographic keys. Attribute-
Based Encryption [12] could be used to protect the confidentiality
of data for categories and would avoid the need for category keys
when encrypting and decrypting. Ring signatures [45] could be used
to protect the integrity of data for categories and would similarly
avoid the need for category keys when signing and verifying. We
take the approach of using simpler cryptographic primitives as they
are more amenable to our proofs. Additionally, as a benefit of taking
a language-based approach, Clio’s ideal semantics is agnostic to
the choice of cryptosystem used. From a user’s perspective the
underlying cryptographic operations could be swapped out in favor
of more efficient cryptosystems without changing the semantics of
the system (provided the real semantics was shown separately to
provide CTA security and security against leveraged forgery).
There is also work on strengthening the guarantees of existing
cryptosystems to protect against more powerful adversaries, e.g.,
Chosen Ciphertext Attack (CCA) [43] security for adversaries that
can observe decryptions of arbitrary ciphertexts. CCA security
is needed in systems where an adversary can observe (some of)
the effects of decrypting arbitrary ciphertexts. In contrast, Clio’s
security guarantees are based on a very precise definition of the
adversary’s power over the system. In particular it captures that
an adversary cannot observe anything about the decryptions of
confidential values due to IFC mechanisms, since the results of such
a decryption would be protected by a label that is more confidential
than an adversary would have access to. As a result, Clio requires
only a CPA secure cryptosystem to be CTA secure.
Systems. DStar [65] extends decentralized IFC in a distributed
system. Every DStar node has an exporter that is responsible for
communicating over the network. Exporters also establish the secu-
rity categories trusted by a node via private/public keys. Fabric [34]
is a platform and statically-checked fine-grained IFC language. Fab-
ric supports the secure transfer of data as well as code [2] through,
in part, the use of cryptographic mechanisms. In contrast to Fabric,
Clio provides coarse-grained IFC and uses DC labels instead of the
DLM. In contrast to both DStar and Fabric, this work establishes a
formal basis for security of the use of cryptography in the system.
The lack of a formal proof in both DStar and Fabric is not surprising,
given that they target more ambitious and complex scenarios (i.e.,
decentralized information-flow control for distributed systems).
Remote storage. While data can be stored and fetched crypto-
graphically, information can be still leaked through access patterns.
Private Information Retrieval protocols aim to avoid such leaks by
hiding queries and answers from a potentially malicious server [16]
similar to Clio’s threat model. For performance reasons [42, 50],
some approaches rely on a small trusted execution environment
provided by hardware [20, 58] that provides the cryptographic sup-
port needed to obliviously query the data store [9, 52, 62]. This
technique can be seen in oblivious computing [35], online advertis-
ing [11], and credit networks [38] for clients which are benign or
follow an strict access protocol. If clients are malicious, however,
attacker’s code may leak information though access patterns. We
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force communication with the store to occur in non-sensitive con-
tests. In addition, our language-based techniques could be extended
to require untrusted code to follow an oblivious protocol.
8 Conclusion
Clio is a computationally secure coarse-grained dynamic information-
flow control library that uses cryptography to protect the confiden-
tiality and integrity of data. The use of cryptography is hidden from
the language operations and is controlled instead through familiar
language constructs in an existing IFC library, LIO. Further, we
present a novel proof technique that combines standard program-
ming language and cryptographic proof techniques to show the
interaction between the high-level security guarantees provided
by information flow control and the low-level guarantees offered
by the cryptographic mechanisms are secure. We also provide a
prototype Clio implementation in the form of a Haskell library
extending LIO to evaluate its practicality. We see Clio as a way for
programmers that are non-expert cryptographers to use cryptogra-
phy securely.
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A Complete Definitions
A.1 Security Lattice Orderings and Operators
We use three lattices (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) whose domains (named C, I, and A) are formulas of principals in conjuctive
normal form. We define an information flow ordering ⊑ (read as “can flow to”). We give the definitions of each below, where⇒,∧,∨ are the
usual classical logical connectives:
Confidentiality.
C ⊑C C ′ ⇐⇒ C ′ ⇒ C
C ĹC C ′ ⇐⇒ C ⊑C C ′ and C , C ′
C ⊔C C ′ ⇐⇒ C ∧C ′
C ⊓C C ′ ⇐⇒ C ∨C ′
⊥C ≡ True ⊤C ≡ False
Integrity.
I ⊑I I ′ ⇐⇒ I ⇒ I ′
I ĹI I ′ ⇐⇒ I ⊑I I ′ and I , I ′
I ⊔I I ′ ⇐⇒ I ∨ I ′
I ⊓I I ′ ⇐⇒ I ∧ I ′
⊥I ≡ False ⊤I ≡ True
Availability.
A ⊑A A′ ⇐⇒ A⇒ A′
A ĹA A′ ⇐⇒ A ⊑A A′ and A , A′
A ⊔A A′ ⇐⇒ A ∨A′
A ⊓A A′ ⇐⇒ A ∧A′
⊥A ≡ False ⊤A ≡ True
We define the security lattice of DC labels as a product lattice of the three individual lattices to form a security lattice whose domain is a
triple of principal formulas (l = ⟨C, I ,A⟩) and whose ordering is based on safe information flows. We also define a trust ordering ⪯ (read as
“at least as trustworthy as”):
⟨C, I ,A⟩ ⊑ ⟨C ′, I ′,A′⟩ ⇐⇒ C ⊑C C ′ and I ⊑I I ′ and A ⊑A A′
⟨C, I ,A⟩ Ĺ ⟨C ′, I ′,A′⟩ ⇐⇒ C ĹC C ′ or I ĹI I ′ or A ĹA A′
⟨C, I ,A⟩ ⪯ ⟨C ′, I ′,A′⟩ ⇐⇒ C ⊑C C ′ and I ′ ⊑I I and A′ ⊑A A
⟨C, I ,A⟩ ⊔ ⟨C ′, I ′,A′⟩ ⇐⇒ ⟨ C ⊔C C ′ , I ⊔I I ′ , A ⊔A A′ ⟩
⟨C, I ,A⟩ ⊓ ⟨C ′, I ′,A′⟩ ⇐⇒ ⟨ C ⊓C C ′ , I ⊓I I ′ , A ⊓A A′ ⟩
⊥ ≡ ⟨⊥C ,⊥I ,⊥A⟩ ⊤ ≡ ⟨⊤C ,⊤I ,⊤A⟩
For convenience of avoiding pattern matching over the components of a label when needing to inspect an individual component, we
define the following projection functions:
C(⟨C, I ,A⟩)= C
I(⟨C, I ,A⟩)= I
A(⟨C, I ,A⟩)= A
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A.2 Cryptography Background Definitions
• Distribution Ensemble: An ensemble of probability distributions is a sequence {Xn }n∈N of probability distributions.
• Negligible Function: A negligible function is a function f (x) : N→ R such that for every positive integer c ∈ Z+ there exists an
integer Nc such that for all x > Nc : f (x) < 1
xc
• Computationally Indistinguishable: Let {Xn }n and {Yn }n be distribution ensembles. Then we say that they are computationally
indistinguishable ≈ if for any non-uniform PPT A the following function is negligible in n:Pr[A(x) = 1 | x ← Xn ] − Pr[A(y) = 1 | y ← Yn ]
.
• Hybrid Argument: Let X1, ...,Xm be a sequence of probability distributions, wherem is polynomial in n. Suppose there exists a
distinguisher D that distinguishes X1 and Xm with probability ϵ . Then there exists i ∈ [1,m − 1] such that D distinguishes Xi and
Xi+1 with probability ϵm . (Proof uses Triangle Inequality)• Cryptosystem: We consider a asymmetric encryption system and signature scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec,Sign,Verify) such that
Gen : 1n → ({0, 1}n , {0, 1}n ) representing the public key and private key to use in the assymetric cryptographic functions.
• Correctness of Cryptosystem For correctness of our encryption system, we require that if p ∈ {0, 1}∗ and (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n ) and
c = Enc(pk,p) then p = Dec(sk, c).
For correctness of our signature scheme, we require that if p ∈ {0, 1}∗ and (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n ) and s = Sign(sk,p) then 1 =
Verify(pk, s).
To simplify the notation while mainting easy-to-prove security properties, we require that the encryption and signature functions
operate on independent parts of the key; that is, they internally use a key derivation function (e.g., encryption uses the first half, and
signing uses the second half).
• Security of Cryptosystem: For our encryption functions, we assume the cryptosystem is CPA secure, defined as follows [43]. Let
the random variable INDb (A,n) denote the output of the experiment, where A is a non-uniform p.p.t., n ∈ , b ∈ {0, 1} :
INDb (A,n) = (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n );
m0,m1,A2 ← A(pk) s.t. |m0 | = |m1 |;
c ← Enc(pk,mb );
Output A2(c)
Then we say that Π is CPA (Chosen-Plaintext Attack) secure if for all non-uniform p.p.t. A:{
IND0(A,n)
}
n
≈
{
IND1(A,n)
}
n
Note that we consider the cryptographic functions themselves to be public.
For security of the signature scheme, we assume Π is secure against existential forgery.
• Indistinguishability Corrollary: The CPA definition may be difficult to understand to some as it is phrased in the form of a game.
An alternative definition of security (that is a fairly direct consequence of CPA security) is: For all p0,p1, if |p0 | = |p1 | then,{
Enc(pk,p0) | (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n )
}
n
≈
{
Enc(pk,p1) | (pk, sk) ← Gen(1n )
}
n
Informally, the results of encrypting of equal-length plaintexts are computationally indistinguishable.
• Digital Signature Forgery: We require our digital signature scheme to be secure against existential forgery under a Chosen-Message
Attack, where the adversary is a non-unfiorm ppt in the size of the key [25]:
– Existential Foregery: The adversary succeeds in forging the signature of one message, not necessarily of his choice.
– Chosen-Message Attack: The adversary is allowed to ask the signer to sign a number of messages of the adversary’s choice. The
choice of these messages may depend on previously obtained signatures. For example, one may think of a notary public who signs
documents on demand.
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A.3 LIO Complete Syntax and Typing Rules
Ground Value: v F true | false | () | l | (v,v)
Value: v F v | (v,v) | x | λx .t | tLIO | ‹v :l›
Term: t F v | (t , t) | t t | fix t | if t then t else t
| t1 ⊔ t2 | t1 ⊓ t2 | t1 ⊑ t2
| return t | t ≫= t
| label t t | labelOf t | unlabel t
| getLabel | getClearance | lowerClearance t
| toLabeled t t | ll {l t }
| store t t | fetch τ t t
Ground Type: τ F Bool | () | Label | (τ ,τ )
Type: τ F τ | (τ ,τ ) | τ → τ | LIO τ | Labeled τ
bool
b ∈ {true, false}
Γ ⊢ b : Bool
unit
Γ ⊢ () : ()
label
Γ ⊢ l : Label
pair
Γ ⊢ t1 : τ1 Γ ⊢ t2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ (t1, t2) : (τ1,τ2)
labeled
Γ ⊢ v : τ
Γ ⊢ ‹v :l› : Labeled τ
var
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ
abstraction
Γ[x 7→ τ1] ⊢ t1 : τ2
Γ ⊢ λx . t1 : τ1 → τ2
app
Γ ⊢ t1 : τ2 → τ1 Γ ⊢ t2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ t1 t2 : τ1
fix
Γ ⊢ t : (τ1 → τ2) → τ2
Γ ⊢ fix t : τ1 → τ2
LIO
Γ ⊢ t : τ
Γ ⊢ tLIO : LIO τ
if
Γ ⊢ t1 : Bool Γ ⊢ t2 : τ Γ ⊢ t3 : τ
Γ ⊢ if t1 then t2 else t3 : τ
LabelOp
⊗ ∈ {⊓,⊔,⊑} Γ ⊢ t1 : Label Γ ⊢ t2 : Label
Γ ⊢ t1 ⊗ t2 : Label
getLabel
Γ ⊢ getLabel : Label
getClearance
Γ ⊢ getClearance : Label
lowerClearance
Γ ⊢ t : Label
Γ ⊢ lowerClearance t : LIO ()
labelOf
Γ ⊢ t : Labeled τ
Γ ⊢ labelOf t : Label
return
Γ ⊢ t : τ
Γ ⊢ return t : LIO τ
bind
Γ ⊢ t1 : LIO τ1 Γ ⊢ t2 : τ1 → LIO τ2
Γ ⊢ t1 ≫= t2 : LIO τ2
label
Γ ⊢ t1 : Label Γ ⊢ t2 : τ
Γ ⊢ label t1 t2 : Labeled τ
unlabel
Γ ⊢ t : Labeled τ
Γ ⊢ unlabel t : LIO τ
toLabeled
Γ ⊢ t1 : Label Γ ⊢ t2 : LIO τ
Γ ⊢ toLabeled t1 t2 : Labeled τ
reset
Γ ⊢ t : LIO τ
Γ ⊢ l1l3 {
l2 t } : Labeled τ
store
Γ ⊢ t1 : τ ′ Γ ⊢ t2 : Labeled τ
Γ ⊢ store t1 t2 : LIO ()
fetch
Γ ⊢ t1 : τ ′ Γ ⊢ t2 : Labeled τ
Γ ⊢ fetch τ t1 t2 : LIO (Labeled τ )
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A.4 LIO Remaining Step Rules
The program state is c = ⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩ where lcur is the current label, lclr is the current clearance. Computation is modeled as a small-step
semantics c α−→ c ′. We use labels α to represent interaction with the store.
E F [·] | E t | if E then t else t | E ≫= t | label E t
| E ⊔ t | l ⊔ E | E ⊓ t | l ⊔ E | E ⊑ t | l ⊑ E
| label v E | labelOf E | unlabel E
| lowerClearance E | toLabeled E t | ll {l E }
| store E t | store v E | fetch τ E t | fetch τ v E
app
⟨lcur, lclr | (λx .t1) t2⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | [t2/x] t1⟩
fix
⟨lcur, lclr | fix (λx .t)⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | [fix (λx .t)/x] t⟩
ifTrue
⟨lcur, lclr | if true then t2 else t3⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | t2⟩
getLabel
⟨lcur, lclr | getLabel⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | return lcur⟩
ifFalse
⟨lcur, lclr | if false then t2 else t3⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | t3⟩
getClearance
⟨lcur, lclr | getClearance⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | return lclr⟩
lowerClearance
lcur ⊑ l1 l1 ⊑ lclr
⟨lcur, lclr | lowerClearance l1⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, l1 | return ()⟩
LabelOp
⊗ ∈ {⊓,⊔,⊑} v = l1 ⊗ l2
⟨lcur, lclr | l1 ⊗ l2⟩ −→ ⟨lcur, lclr | v⟩
Step
⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩ −→ ⟨l ′cur, l ′clr | t ′⟩
⟨lcur, lclr | E[t]⟩ −→ ⟨l ′cur, l ′clr | E[t ′]⟩
Where ℓ is the store adversary level.
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A.5 Complete Low Equivalence Relation
Terms:
v1 =ℓ v2 if v1 = v2
‹v1 :l1› =ℓ ‹v2 :l1› where
v1 = v2 if C(l1) ⊑C C(ℓ)
and I(l1) ĹI I(ℓ)
and A(l1) ĹA A(ℓ),
typeOf v1 = typeOf v2 otherwise
(v1,v2) =ℓ (v ′1,v ′2) if v1 =ℓ v ′1 and v2 =ℓ v ′2
t1 t2 =ℓ t
′
1 t
′
2 if t1 =ℓ t
′
1 and t2 =ℓ t
′
2
fix t =ℓ fix t ′ if t =ℓ t ′
if t1 then t2 else t3 =ℓ if t ′1 then t
′
2 else t
′
3 if t1 =ℓ t
′
1 and t2 =ℓ t
′
2 and t3 =ℓ t
′
3
return t =ℓ return t ′ if t =ℓ t ′
t1 ≫= t2 =ℓ t ′1 ≫= t ′2 if t1 =ℓ t ′1 and t2 =ℓ t ′2
label t1 t2 =ℓ label t ′1 t
′
2 if t1 =ℓ t
′
1 and t2 =ℓ t
′
2
labelOf t =ℓ labelOf t ′ if t =ℓ t ′
unlabel t =ℓ unlabel t ′ if t =ℓ t ′
getLabel =ℓ getLabel
getClearance =ℓ getClearance
lowerClearance t =ℓ lowerClearance t ′ if t =ℓ t ′
toLabeled t1 t2 =ℓ toLabeled t ′1 t
′
2 if t1 =ℓ t
′
1 and t2 =ℓ t
′
2
l1
l2
{l3 t } =ℓ l
′
1
l ′2
{l3 t ′ } if l1 =ℓ l ′1 and l2 =ℓ l ′2 and t =ℓ t ′
store t1 t2 =ℓ store t ′1 t
′
2 if t1 =ℓ t
′
1 and t2 =ℓ t
′
2
fetch τ t1 t2 =ℓ fetch τ t ′1 t
′
2 if t1 =ℓ t
′
1 and t2 =ℓ t
′
2
Configurations:
⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩ =ℓ ⟨l ′cur, l ′clr | t ′⟩ if t =ℓ t ′ and lcur = l ′cur and lclr = l ′clr⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩ =ℓ ⟨l ′cur, l ′clr | t ′⟩ if (lcur ̸⊑ ℓ and l ′cur ̸⊑ ℓ) and (lclr ̸⊑ ℓ and l ′clr ̸⊑ ℓ)
Confidentiality Low Equivalence. Define =C
ℓ
to be the low equivalence relation with respect to only confidentiality. The integrity and
availability parts of the label are ignored.
v1 =
C
ℓ
v2 if v1 = v2
‹v1 :l1› =Cℓ ‹v2 :l1› where{
v1 = v2 if C(l1) ⊑C C(ℓ)
typeOf v1 = typeOf v2 otherwise
(v1,v2) =Cℓ (v ′1,v ′2) if v1 =Cℓ v ′1 and v2 =ℓ v ′2
t1 t2 =Cℓ t
′
1 t
′
2 if t1 =
C
ℓ
t ′1 and t2 =ℓ t
′
2
...
Configurations:
⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩ =Cℓ ⟨l ′cur, l ′clr | t ′⟩ if t =Cℓ t ′ and lcur = l ′cur and lclr = l ′clr
⟨lcur, lclr | t⟩ =Cℓ ⟨l ′cur, l ′clr | t ′⟩ if C(lcur) ̸⊑C C(ℓ) and C(l ′cur) ̸⊑C C(ℓ) and C(lclr) ̸⊑C C(ℓ) and l ′clr ̸⊑C C(ℓ)
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A.6 Ideal Clio Complete Syntax and Semantics
The ideal Clio state is ⟨c,σ ⟩ where c is the LIO configuration and σ is a mapping σ : v → ‹v :l›⊥, where ⊥ represents a corrupted entry.
Internal-Step
c −→ c ′
⟨c,σ ⟩ ⇝ ⟨c ′,σ ⟩
Store
c
put ‹v : l1› at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′ σ ′ = σ [vk 7→ ‹v :l1›]
⟨c,σ ⟩ ⇝ ⟨c ′,σ ′⟩
Fetch-Exists
c
got τ ‹v : l1› at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′ ‹v :l1› = σ (vk )
⟨c,σ ⟩ ⇝ ⟨c ′,σ ⟩
Fetch-Missing
c
nothing-at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′ σ (vk ) = ⊥
⟨c,σ ⟩ ⇝ ⟨c ′,σ ⟩
Ideal interactions I are given by the following syntax:
I F I · I | I
I F skip = λσ .σ
| put ‹v :l1› at v ′ = λσ . σ [v ′ 7→ ‹v :l1›] s.t. I(ℓ) ⊑I I(l1)
| corrupt v1, ...vn = λσ .σ [v1 7→ ⊥; ... vn 7→ ⊥]
The low-step relation↷I from ideal Clio configurations to Clio configurations using adversary interaction I .
Low-Step
⟨c, I (σ )⟩ ⇝ ⟨c ′,σ ′⟩
PC(c) ⊑ ℓ PC(c ′) ⊑ ℓ
(⟨c,σ ⟩, I )↷ ⟨c ′,σ ′⟩
Low-to-High-to-Low-Step
⟨c, I (σ )⟩ ⇝ ⟨c0,σ0⟩
⟨c0,σ0⟩ ⇝ ...⇝ ⟨c j ,σj ⟩
∀0≤i<j . PC(ci ) ̸⊑ ℓ PC(c j ) ⊑ ℓ
(⟨c,σ ⟩, I )↷ ⟨c j ,σj ⟩
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A.7 Complete Definitions for Labeled Value Serialization
• initialize_ckP (σ ,C) = (fetch_ckP (σ ,C), skip) if fetch_ckP (σ ,C) defined
• initialize_ckP (σ ,C) = (fetch_ckP (R(σ ),C),R) if fetch_ckP (σ ,C) undefined and R = create_ckP (σ ,C)
• create_ckP (σ ,p1 ∨ ... ∨ pn ) = store (p1 ∨ ... ∨ pi ∨ ... ∨ pn ) (pk,mn , s) where
(pk, sk) ← Gen(1n )
m0 = ∅
for i from 1 to n:
(pki , ski ) = P(pi )
mi ←mi−1[pi 7→ Enc(pki , sk)]
s ← Sign(ski , (pk,m)) if ski , ⊥
• fetch_ckP (σ ,p1 ∨ ... ∨ pi ∨ ... ∨ pn ) = (pk, sk) where
(pk,m, s) = σ (p1 ∨ ... ∨ pi ∨ ... ∨ pn )
(pki , ski ) = P(pi ) where i chosen s.t. ski , ⊥
sk = Dec(ski ,m(pi ))
Verify(pkj , (pk,m), s) = 1 for some pkj in the category.
• EncP (σ0, ⟨C1 ∧ ... ∧Ci ∧ ... ∧Cn , li ⟩,v0) = (Rn · ... · R1,vn ) where
for i from 1 to n:
((pki , ski ),Ri ) ← initialize_ckP (σi−1,Ci )
σi = Ri (σi−1)
vi ← Enc(pki ,vi−1)
• SignP (σ0, ⟨lc ,C1 ∧ ... ∧Cn⟩,v) = (Rn · ... · R1, s1, ..., sn ) where
for i from 1 to n:
((pki , ski ),Ri ) ← initialize_ckP (σi−1,Ci )
σi = Ri (σi−1)
si ← Sign(ski ,v)
• DecP (σ , ⟨C1 ∧ ... ∧Cn , li ⟩,vn ) = v0 where
for i from n to 1:
(pki , ski ) = fetch_ckP (σ ,Ci )
vi−1 = Dec(ski ,vi )
• VerifyP (σ , ⟨lc ,C1 ∧ ... ∧Cn⟩,v, s1, ..., sn ) = 1 if
for i from n to 1:
(pki , ski ) = fetch_ckP (σ ,Ci )
1 = Verify(pki ,v, si )
Similar to the category key meta-functions, we also annotate the results of the meta-functions with the interactions made on the store so
that we can track what actions are being taken on the crypto store.
With these cryptographic functions operating on labels, we are now ready to describe the meta-functions which convert a labeled value
to a bit string and vice-versa.
• serializeP (σ , ‹v :l›) = {| (R2 · R1, ‹b :l›) | (R,b) ← EncP (R1(σ ), l , (v, s1, ..., sn )); (R1, s1, ..., sn ) ← SignP (σ , l ,v) |}
• deserializeP (σ , ‹b :l›,τ ) = ‹v :l› if VerifyP (σ , l ,v, s1, ..., sn ) = 1 and DecP (σ , l ,b) = (v, s1, ..., sn ) and typeOf v = τ
We use the convenience function pub(P) to represent the projection of the keystore that only contains the public key parts of the keystores,
and no private keys.
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A.8 Real Clio Complete Syntax and Semantics
Keystores: P : p → (b,b⊥)
Bit strings: b ∈ {0, 1}∗
Stores: σ : (v → ‹b :l›⊥) ∪ (C → ck⊥)
Versions: V : v → n
Interactions: R F R · R | R
R F skip = λσ . σ
| put ck at C = λσ . σ [C 7→ ck]
| put ‹b :l› at vk = λσ . σ [vk 7→ ‹b :l›]
Strategies: S : → 
Category Keys: ck F (b, esk, b ′)
Encrypted Keys: esk : p → b
keystore Label Functions
min(P) = p1 ∨ ... ∨ pi ∨ ... ∨ pn for all pi ∈ dom(P)
max(P) = p1 ∧ ... ∧ pi ∧ ... ∧ pn for all pi ∈ dom(P)
and ski , ⊥ where P(pi ) = (pki , ski )
Start(P) = ⟨min(P),max(P),max(P)⟩⟩
Clr(P) = ⟨max(P),min(P),min(P)⟩⟩
authorityOf(P) = ⟨max(P),max(P),max(P)⟩
Interaction: R F skip = λσ . σ
| put ‹b :l1› at vk = λσ . σ [vk 7→ ‹b :l1›]
| put ck at C = λσ . σ [C 7→ ck]
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The interaction concatenation operation R · R sequences interactions. We use the notation R = R · ... · R to denote a sequence of
interactions.
The real Clio state is ⟨c,,V⟩ where c is the LIO configuration, σ is the store.
Internal-Step
c −→ c ′
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝1 ⟨c ′,,V⟩
Store
c
put ‹v : l1› at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′
n = increment(V(vk )) V′ = V[vk 7→ n]
′ = {| put ‹b :l1› at vk · R′ · R
 R ← ;
(R′, ‹b :l1›) ← serializeP (σ , ‹(v,vk ,n) :l1›) |}
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝1 ⟨c ′,′,V′⟩
Fetch-Exists
c
got τ ‹v : l1› at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′ n ≮ V(vk )
(σ ,p) ∈ {| R(∅) | R ←  |} p > 0
‹(v,vk ,n) :l1› = deserializeP (σ ,σ (vk ),τ )
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c,,V⟩
Fetch-Missing
c
nothing-at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′
(σ ,p) ∈ {| R(∅) | R ←  |} p > 0
deserializeP (σ ,σ (vk ),τ ) undefined
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c,,V⟩
Fetch-Replay
c
nothing-at vk−−−−−−−−−−−−→ c ′ v ′k , vk or n < V(vk )
(σ ,p) ∈ {| R(∅) | R ←  |} p > 0
‹(v,v ′k ,n) :l1› = deserializeP (σ ,σ (vk ),τ )
⟨c,,V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c,,V⟩
The low-step relation↷p from real Clio configurations and adversary interactions to Clio configurations with probability p.
Low-Step
′ = {| RA · R | RA ← A; R ←  |}
⟨c,′,V⟩ ⇝p ⟨c ′,′′,V′⟩
PC(c) ⊑ C(ℓ) PC(c ′) ⊑ C(ℓ)
(⟨c,,V⟩,A)↷p ⟨c ′,′′,V′⟩
Low-to-High-to-Low-Step
′ = {| RA · R | RA ← A; R ←  |}
⟨c,′,V⟩ ⇝p0 ⟨c0,0,V)⟩
⟨c0,0,V0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pj ⟨c j ,j ,Vj ⟩
∀0≤i<j . PC(ci ) ̸⊑ ℓ PC(c j ) ⊑ ℓ p = Π0≤i≤j pi
(⟨c,,V⟩,A)↷p ⟨c j ,j ,Vj ⟩
The step function encodes the distribution of real Clio states after taking j low steps:
stepP
ℓ
(c0,S, 1) =
{(⟨c1,1,V1⟩,p0 · p1)  (⟨c0, {(skip, 1)}, Σ0⟩,S({(skip, 1)}))↷p1 ⟨c1,1,V1⟩ }
stepP
ℓ
(c0,S, j + 1) =
{(⟨c2,2,V2⟩,p0 · p1)  (⟨c1,1,V1⟩,p0) ∈ stepPℓ (c0,S, j); (⟨c1,1,V1⟩,S(1))↷p1 ⟨c2,2,V2⟩ }
Note that, we consider only configurations and strategies that can and always will take at least j low steps for all strategies. That is, there
is no possibility for a trace to fail to make a low step before j low steps. As a result, the step function will always produce a distribution (i.e.,
their probabilities will add up to 1). The program should be written in such a way that it is defensively written to ensure that it can take at
least j low steps.
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B Complete Theorems and Proofs
B.1 Clio Interaction Indistinguishability Lemmas
Lemma B.1 (Round 1: Multi-Message Security). For allm1{1,2} ...m
n
{1,2} and all principals p˜, if |m0i | = |m1i | for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k , and Π is
CPA Secure, then {
Enc(pk11 ,m11), ..., Enc(pk i1 ,m i1 ), ..., Enc(pkk1 ,mk1 )
 P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); (pki2, ski2) ∈ rnд(P); 1 ≤ i ≤ k}n≈{
Enc(pk12 ,m12), ..., Enc(pk i2 ,m i2 ), ..., Enc(pkk2 ,mk2 )
 P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); (pki2, ski2) ∈ rnд(P); 1 ≤ i ≤ k}n
Proof. We perform a proof by contradiction: we assume the consequent does not hold and construct a counter-example to the CPA-security
of Π.
The lengths of the sequences of encryptions are equal by setup. The sequences are also polynomial in n as each low step produces a
polynomial number of messages and the number of low steps is polynomial in n as k is fixed.
This setup is equivalent to the multi-message CPA security problem. We use the same general technique to show that single-message CPA
security. gives rise to multi-message CPA security by using a hybrid argument.
We can define a hybrid sequence of messages
Hi =
{
m11; ...; m
i
1 ; m
i+1
2 ; ...; m
k
2 }
such that at the point i we switch from using the sequence of messages from the first run to using the sequence of messages from the
second run. By the hybrid argument, there must exist an i that distinguishes Hi and Hi+1 with non-negligible probability in n. We will fix on
that i . So we can now construct the following CPA adversary:
(1) By assumption of our proof by contradiction, there exists a Round 1 adversary that can distinguish Hi and Hi+1 for a particular i and
particularm{0,1}1 , ...,m
{0,1}
n , and call it AR1.
(2) In our construction, we generate a new keystore P as defined in the lemma statement and give the plaintext messagesmi+12 andmi+11
to the CPA game and it will then provide us back a ciphertext c of one of the messages.
(3) We create a new sequence of encrypted messages in the following way:
H =
{
Enc(pk11 ,m11); ...; Enc(pki1,m i1 ); c; Enc(pki+22 ,m i+22 ); ...; Enc(pkk2 ,mk2 )
 pko{1,2} ← Gen(1n ); 1 ≤ o ≤ k}}
In the case where the CPA game chose messagemi+12 we have that H = Hi and in the other case wherem
i+1
1 we have that H = Hi+1.
Since AR1 can distinguish exactly this case and that the choice of message encrypted determines which sequence of messages was
used, we can as a result distinguish which plain-text message was chosen by the CPA game with non-negligible probability.
As a result of constructing a CPA adversary that can distinguish plain-text messages with non-negligible probability, we have shown a
contradiction, and can conclude that the above sequences of encryptions is indistinguishable.
□
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Definition B.2 (Low Equivalent Interactions). Let LP (R) to be a fixed function (i.e., it does not change its behavior based on its inputs) from
interactions to interactions such that the result contains the original sequence of interactions with low interactions added at statically fixed
locations in the sequence. Let the resulting sequences of interactions be called low equivalent interactions.
A low interaction is a skip command or a put ‹b :l1› at vk such that
C(l1) ⊑C C(authorityOf(P)) and ‹(v,vk ,n) :l1› = deserializeP (R, ‹b :l1›) or put p˜′ at C .
LemmaB.3 (Round 2: Secret and LowEqivalent Interactions). For all keystoresP0, and l1, ..., lk , such thatC(li ) ⊑C C(authorityOf(P)),
and for allm1{1,2} ...m
n
{1,2} and all principals p˜, if |mi1 | = |mi2 | for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and Π is CPA Secure, then{
LP0
(
put ‹b11 :l
1› at v1 · ... · put ‹bk1 :lk › at vk
)
| P ← Gen(1n ); (pki , ski ) ∈ rnд(P); bi1 ← Enc(pki ,mi1); 1 ≤ i ≤ k
}
n
≈{
LP0
(
put ‹b12 :l
1› at v1 · ... · put ‹bk2 :lk › at vk
)
| P ← Gen(1n ); (pki , ski ) ∈ rnд(P); bi2 ← Enc(pki ,mi2); 1 ≤ i ≤ k
}
n
Proof. We perform a reduction to the Round 1 adversary. That is, if there exists a Round 2 adversary AR2 then there also exists a Round
1 adversary, which will provide a contradiction.
We construct our adversary as follows. Given a sequence of secret encryptions (from Round 1), we can construct the input to the L
function by constructing a constant set of labels l1 to ln arbitrarily so long as they flow to C(authorityOf(P)), which is a static property and
also arbitrary input keys. We can then also construct the entry keys vi in the same static fashion. When then just apply the deterministic L
function and pass that to AR2.
Since we have shown how to construct a Round 1 adversary from a Round 2 adversary, we have a contradiction of the Round 1 lemma, so
we conclude our proof.
□
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Definition B.4 (Clio Interactions). Letm1{1,2}, ...,m
k
{1,2} be sequences of messages such that |mi1 | = |mi2 |. Further, let R
1
{1,2}, ...,R
j
{1,2} be
sequences of low equivalent interactions (from Definition 2) whose ciphertexts are based on slices of the underlying message. For example
R
1
1 = put (b, {p 7→ Enc(pk,m11)},bs ) at C · put Enc(pk,m21) at v1
R
2
1 = skip
R
3
1 = put Enc(pk ′,m31) at v3
...
R
j
1 = put Enc(pk ′′,mk1 ) at v j
Then we say two sequences of interactions are Clio equivalent ≍ iff they are of the form, with all but negligible probability,{
R
1
1 · R′21 · ... · R j1 · R
′j
1
 P ← Gen(1n ); (pki , ski ) ∈ rnд(P); bi1 ← Enc(pki ,mi1); 1 ≤ i ≤ k ;
t ,v {0,1},S ← A(1n ); R′s1 ← S(Rs1 · ... · R j1 · R
′j
1 ); 1 < s < j; R
′j
1 ← S(skip)
}
n≍{
R
1
2 · R′22 · ... · R j2 · R
′j
2
 P ← Gen(1n ); (pki , ski ) ∈ rnд(P); bi2 ← Enc(pki ,mi2); 1 ≤ i ≤ k ;
t ,v {0,1},S ← A(1n ); R′s2 ← S(Rs2 · ... · R j2 · R
′j
2 ); 1 < s < j; R
′j
2 ← S(skip)
}
n
Lemma B.5 (Round 3: Clio Interactions Indistinguishability). For all families of distributions 1 and 2, if 1 ≍ 2 and Π is CPA
secure, then 1 ≈ 2.
Proof. Similar to the previous rounds, we will reduce this problem to the Round 2 Secret and Low Equivalent Interactions indistinguisha-
bility problem. If there exists a Round 3 adversary AR3 then there also exists a Round 2 adversary, which will provide a contradiction.
We construct our adversary as follows. Given a sequence of low equivalent interactions (from Round 2) R1 and R2, we subdivide the
interactions into sequences of interactions R1{1,2} ...R
j
{1,2} . We also add the categories in storing category keys arbitrarily in a static way
and also add the category key signatures (as it was not in the previous round) by just performing the signing process according to the
initialize_ckP function.
For the strategy interactions, we just perform the draws from the strategy starting from the end of the sequences of interactions, working
backwards and place them in their corresponding positions, i.e., R′s ← S(Rs · ... ·R′j ·R j for 1 < s < j . We note that, although the interactions
may differ they are indistinguishable. That is because the first sequence of interactions R j{1,2} is a sub-problem of the Round 2 sequences of
interactions. As a result, since the two sequences of interactions are computationally indistinguishable, then their corresponding draws from
the strategy are also computationally indistinguishable.
As a result, we can then pass the final sequence of interactions to AR2 to distinguish the distributions. Since we have shown how to
construct a Round 2 adversary from a Round 3 adversary, we have a contradiction of the Round 2 lemma, so we conclude our proof.
□
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B.2 Clio Preservation of Low Equivalence
Lemma B.6 (Preservation of Low Eqivalence). For all keystores P0 where ℓ = authorityOf(P0), LIO configurations c1, c2, strategies S,
and principals p˜, and j ∈ , if Π is CPA Secure and c1 =Cℓ c2, then
Pr
[
⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ≠Cℓ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ or V1 , V2

P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P1 = P0 ⊎ P; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepP1ℓ (c1,S, j);
P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P2 = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepP2ℓ (c2,S, j)
]
is negligible in n, and{
R1
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepPℓ (c1,S, j); R1 ← 1 }n≍{
R2
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepPℓ (c2,S, j); R2 ← 2 }n
Proof. We will prove this lemma in two steps: first by showing that the invariant is preserved across Clio steps⇝∗p and then using that
fact, we can show that the invariant is also preserved across Clio low steps↷p .
Proof on Step relation⇝p :We will perform induction on the derivation of the steps (which will be finite when used with the low-step
rules, i.e., it is well-founded) with the number of steps being k being 1 less than the total number of (possibly high) steps in the context of a
single low step.
Our inductive hypothesis will be if ⟨c1, skip,V1⟩ =Cℓ ⟨c ′2, skip,V2⟩ and Π is CPA Secure, then,
Pr
[
⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ≠Cℓ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ or V1 , V2

P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P1 = P0 ⊎ P; ⟨c1, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pk ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩;
P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P2 = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c2, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p′1 ...⇝p′k′ ⟨c
′
2,2,V2⟩
]
is negligible in n, and{
R1
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c1, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pk ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩; R1 ← 1 }n≍{
R2
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c2, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p′1 ...⇝p′k′ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩; R2 ← 2 }n
. We must show as our inductive step that if our inductive hypothesis is true, that the following is true:
Pr
[
⟨c ′′1 ,′1,V′1⟩ ≠Cℓ ⟨c ′′2 ,′2,V′2⟩

P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P1 = P0 ⊎ P; ⟨c1, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pk ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ⇝pk+1 ⟨c ′′1 ,′1,V′1⟩;
P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P2 = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c2, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p′1 ...⇝p′k′ ⟨c
′
2,2,V2⟩ ⇝p′k′+1 ⟨c
′′
2 ,
′
2,V
′
2⟩
]
is negligible in n, and{
R
′
1
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c1, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pk ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ⇝pk+1 ⟨c ′′1 ,′1,V′1⟩; R′1 ← ′1 }n≍{
R
′
2
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c2, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p′1 ...⇝p′k′ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ⇝p′k′+1 ⟨c ′′2 ,′2,V′2⟩; R′2 ← ′2 }n
The base case k = 0 is direct as the initial interactions are a special case of Clio interactions (i.e., skip = skip) and Σ0 = Σ0 and we already
know by supposition that c1 =Cℓ c2.
For the inductive case, we now consider the derivation rule used for the k + 1’th step and show that it preserves the inductive hypothesis,
assuming it for the k’th step.
We note that the single steps may take differing numbers of steps (i.e., k and k ′). Due to the Low-to-High-to-Low step rule, though, these
differences only occur when lcur is high. As a result, the only invariant we need to preserve is confidentiality-only low equivalence between
configurations as the high steps do not change the versions, stores, or interactions. We can appeal to the preservation of low equivalence
of LIO proved by Stefan et al. [54] to conclude the preservation confidentiality-only low equivalence of the standard (i.e., non-store and
non-fetch) LIO internal steps. We now consider the low steps that affect the non-standard parts of LIO (i.e., the store and fetch commands).
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We also note that since there are only a polynomial number of steps that the resulting sequences of configurations from single steps that
do not preserve low equivalent in each step will still together be negligible. As a result, we only need to show that the probability of each
step not preserving low equivalence is negligible in n. To that end, we will ignore the traces of steps with negligible probabilities that are not
low equivalent.
• Case Fetch (Fetch-Exists, Fetch-Missing, or Fetch-Replay):
In this case, both configurations have a term with an evaluation context hole that is at a fetch command. That is, they are both
attempting to fetch an entry from the store with key vk and v ′k . Due to low equivalence they are both fetching the same key, vk = v
′
k .
As a result, they must each be using one of the following rules: Fetch-Exists, Fetch-Missing, or Fetch-Replay.
We know by our inductive hypothesis that the distributions of interactions are Clio equivalent. Because the distributions are equal,
we can consider steps where the draws are equivalent for values in the erased distributions. We now consider now each case that c ′1
transitions with.
– Case Fetch-Exists and C(l1) ⊑C C(ℓ): In this case the labeled value will be deserialized the same way and the same labeled value will
be fetched. Since the labeled value is readable by the adversary it must be syntactically equivalent with all but negligible probability,
otherwise the interactions would be distinguishable which would be a counter-example to Lemma B.5. As a result, low equivalence
will be preserved and both configurations will transition in the same way with all but negligible probability.
– Case Fetch-Exists and C(l1) ̸⊑C C(ℓ): In general the value fetched from the store will vary, or it may be the case that only some of the
time a value can even be deserialized. In these cases, the configurations may transition using this rule and other interactions from
the distribution may result in it using another rule. However, if c ′2 transitions using another fetch rule (Fetch-Missing or Fetch-Replay),
the default value will be used. Since secret values can differ and still be low equivalent, the resulting two configurations will still be
low equivalent. In each of these cases, no new interactions are produced so the resulting distributions of interactions are still valid
Clio interactions by our inductive hypothesis (as they did not change). As a result, low equivalence and the valid interactions
invariant is preserved.
– Case Fetch-Missing or Fetch-Replay: In these cases, the default labeled value will be used, which by our inductive hypothesis is already
low equivalent (due to the configurations being low equivalent). The other configurations will transition in a symmetric way
described for the Fetch-Exists rule.
• Case Store:
In this case the distribution of stores and interactions will change so we must show that they remain equivalent. That is, we must
show that { R′1 | R′←′1}n ≍ { R
′
2 | R′2 ← ′2} where
′1 =
{
put ‹b1 :l1› at vk · R′1 · R1
 R1 ← 1;
(R′1, ‹b1 :l1›) ← serializeP (σ1, ‹(v,vk ,n1) :l1›)
}
′2 =
{
put ‹b2 :l1› at vk · R′2 · R2
 R2 ← 2;
(R′2, ‹b2 :l1›) ← serializeP (σ2, ‹(v,vk ,n2) :l1›)
}
We first note that the entry keys are the same from low equivalence. The versions are equal from Clio low equivalence, i.e., n1 = n2.
We also note that the distributions of interactions are valid Clio interactions from our inductive hypothesis. For readable labeled
values, we can conclude that they are syntactically equivalent values from low equivalence. For non-readable values, the types of the
secret values will be the same due to low equivalence (and so the serialized plaintext message will have the same length). As a result
the put ‹b{0,1} :l1› at vk will be a valid extension of valid Clio interactions.
We next consider the creation of category keys (i.e., R′1 and R′2). The initialization of category keys will behave the same way as
described for fetching a labeled value: it will either create new keys (if they were corrupted or not there), or skip. It will do this in the
same way as the resulting interactions are indistinguishable. For the contents of the category keys, we can divide the parts of the
category into deterministic parts (i.e., from Lemma B.3) and secret encryptions.
With these considerations, we conclude that with all but negligible probability the resulting interactions will be valid Clio interactions.
Finally, for the versions mappings, we note that they are both updated equivalently (i.e., incremented by the version in the mapping)
and the versions mappings originally were equal, so the resulting versions are equal.
With all cases of the reduction shown to satisfy the proof obligation, we can conclude the inductive hypothesis is true for all steps used in
the context of a single low step. We next show the low equivalence invariant on the low step relation.
Proof on Low-step relation↷p : by induction on the number of low steps j. Our inductive hypothesis will match our lemma. For
all keystores P0 where ℓ = authorityOf(P0), LIO configurations c1, c2, strategies S, and principals p˜, and j ∈ , if Π is CPA Secure and
c1 =Cℓ c2, then
Pr
[
⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ≠Cℓ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ or V1 , V2

P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P1 = P0 ⊎ P; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepP1ℓ (c1,S, j);
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P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P2 = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepP2ℓ (c2,S, j)
]
is negligible in n, and{
R1
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepPℓ (c1,S, j); R1 ← 1 }n≍{
R2
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepPℓ (c2,S, j); R2 ← 2 }n
• Base Case: j = 1: That is, we will prove the following:
Pr
[
⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ≠Cℓ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ or V1 , V2

P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P1 = P0 ⊎ P; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepP1ℓ (c1,S, 1);
P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P2 = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepP2ℓ (c2,S, 1)
]
is negligible in n, and{
R1
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepPℓ (c1,S, 1); R1 ← 1 }n≍{
R2
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepPℓ (c2,S, 1); R2 ← 2 }n
We must show ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ =Cℓ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ or V1 , V2. There are two cases we must consider in the low step relation, the Low-Step
rule and the Low-to-High-to-Low-Step rule. In the Low-Step, we must show that the inductive hypothesis holds after a single Clio step
⇝p , and for the Low-to-High-to-Low-Step rule must hold for many (finite) Clio steps⇝∗p . Note that the Low-Step rule is a special case of
the Low-to-High-to-Low-Step rule so we only consider the more general case of preserving the invariant across many steps. To show
this, we appeal to the previous proof made to show that the invariant is preserved across Clio steps.
Unlike the single step relation, this includes a strategy interaction on the distribution of stores. Since both interactions receive the
indistinguishable distributions of interactions (from Lemma B.5 and the inductive hypothesis) so the resulting distributions from the
strategy will also be computationally indistinguishable. That is because if they were not, then the strategy itself could be used as a
counter-example for Lemma B.5. In sum, the resulting strategy invocation results in a valid sequence of Clio interactions.
From the previous proof on the single-step relation, we can conclude that
⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ =Cℓ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩. As a result, we satisfy the inductive hypothesis.• Inductive Case j = k + 1: That is, we will prove the following:
Pr
[
⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ≠Cℓ ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ or V1 , V2

P ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P1 = P0 ⊎ P; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepP1ℓ (c1,S,k + 1);
P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P2 = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepP2ℓ (c2,S,k + 1)
]
is negligible in n, and{
R1
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩ ← stepPℓ (c1,S,k + 1); R1 ← 1 }n≍{
R2
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ ← stepPℓ (c2,S,k + 1); R2 ← 2 }n
We now must show that, for any low equivalent configurations that the resulting single step will remain low equivalent. We can use
the same reasoning from the base case to show that the adversary interaction preserves equivalence on distributions of stores. After
this adversary interaction, we can invoke the single-step lemma result here to conclude that c ′′1 =ℓ c
′′
2 .
With the single low step relation handled we now must consider the distribution of distributions of interactions from the step function.
For example, it may be the case that a particular distribution of interactions generated from one trace of low steps may be much more likely
than another distribution of interactions. However, we can use the preservation of low equivalence to reason about the probabilities of
corresponding low equivalent distributions of interactions. We consider the distribution formed from the step function after 1 low step as a
running example to make our arguments concrete, shown graphically in the main matter in Section 5.1.
From our inductive hypothesis we know that corresponding low equivalent configurations have indistinguishable distributions of
interactions. We now must consider the relationship between the probabilities that led to the corresponding low equivalent configurations
(e.g., from the diagram p1 and p2, and also p′1 and p
′
2). If they are similar, then the resulting draws from the distributions will be similar (from
low equivalence).
Consider the pairs of low equivalent configurations and the probabilities that led to those configurations (e.g., from the diagram ⟨c ′1,1,V1⟩
with probability p1 and ⟨c ′2,2,V2⟩ with probability p2). Consider the ways the configurations can differ probabilistically (e.g., from the
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diagram, how c1 steps to both c ′1 and c
′′
1 and how c2 steps to both c
′
2 and c
′′
2 ). The low step relation is just the probability of the trace of
single steps leading to the next low Clio configuration. The Store and Internal-Step rules take steps with probability 1 so they will not cause
the low step to differ probabilistically.
Indeed, only the fetching rules Fetch-Exists, Fetch-Missing, and Fetch-Replay rules will cause the configurations to differ probabilistically. In
particular they will differ based on the interactions drawn, and as a result differ on how those interactions affect the fetch: if the entry is
missing or not deserializeable (Fetch-Missing), if the value can be deserialized but the version is old (Fetch-Replay), or if it was successfully
deserialized and the version is not old (Fetch-Valid).
Due to our inductive hypothesis we know that the distributions of interactions are valid Clio interactions and as a result are indistin-
guishable from Lemma B.5. For readable labeled values, the configurations will step with the same probability in lock-step with all but
negligible probability, as the readable labeled values will be syntactically equivalent (as the distributions of erased stores are equivalent).
In the case where the label of the labeled value is not readable, the rules used to step may not be the same as they are the results of
encrypted values. For example, in one configuration a labeled value may be successfully fetched (using Fetch-Valid) but not in the corresponding
configuration (e.g., Fetch-Missing was used). However, as noted above and by our inductive hypothesis, the different rules used will all step
to a low equivalent configuration. In addition, though, to the configurations being low equivalent, it is also the case that the sums of the
probabilities of all steps taken will be equivalent with all but negligible probability. For example, if c1 steps using Fetch-Missingwith probability
p1, and Fetch-Valid with probability p2, it is also the case that c2 will use the same rules Fetch-Missing with probability p1 and Fetch-Valid
with probability p2 due to indistinguishability of the interactions. That is because if it did not, then an adversary could be constructed
to distinguish the interactions based on the proportions of rules used by the Clio semantics. Intuitively, the draws of indistinguishable
interactions will produce distributions of indistinguishable steps.
With this reasoning, we conclude that the probabilities of each corresponding single step taking place will be equal (e.g., in the diagram
above, p1 = p2 and p2 = p′2). So, the resulting distribution of distributions over interactions will be still be valid Clio interactions and so the≍ relation holds (and, by Lemma B.5, they are also indistinguishable as a result).
□
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B.3 Indistinguishability Proof
Definition B.7 (Chosen-TermAttack (CTA) Game). Let the random variable INDb (P,A, p˜, j,n) denote the output of the following experiment,
where Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec,Sign,Verify), A is a non-uniform ppt, n ∈ , b ∈ {0, 1}:
INDb (P0,A, p˜, j,n) =
P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
t ,v0,v1,S,A2 ← A(pub(P)) such that v0 =Cℓ v1
and ⊢ t : Labeled τ → LIO τ ′
and ⊢ v0 : Labeled τ
and ⊢ v1 : Labeled τ
and ℓ = authorityOf(P0);
⟨c,b ,V′⟩ ← stepPℓ (⟨Start(P),Clr(P) | (t vb )⟩,S, j);
Rb ← b ; Output A2(Rb )
We say that Clio using Π is CTA (Chosen-Term Attack) Secure if for all non-uniform ppt A, j ∈ , keystores P, and principals p˜:{
IND0(P,A, p˜, j,n)
}
n
≈
{
IND1(P,A, p˜, j,n)
}
n
.
Theorem B.8 (Indistinguishability Theorem). If Π if CPA Secure, then Clio using Π is CTA Secure.
Proof. Direct result of low equivalence (interactions are valid Clio interactions, i.e., they satisfy the ≍ relation) and Lemma B.5
(indistinguishability of valid Clio interactions).
□
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B.4 Leveraged Forgery Lemmas
Lemma B.9 (Starting Label is a Floor). For all keystores P0 and terms t and strategies S and principals p˜ and j,
Pr
[
I(PC(c)) ĹI I(Start(P0))

P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n );
P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
⟨c,,V⟩ ← stepP
ℓ
(⟨Start(P0),Clr(P0) | t⟩,S, j)
]
= 0
Proof. We will prove this lemma in two steps: first by showing that the invariant is preserved across Clio steps⇝∗p and then using that
fact, we can show that the invariant is also preserved across Clio low steps↷p ∗. Our invariant will serve as our inductive hypothesis in
both cases.
Proof on Step relation⇝p :We will perform induction on the derivation of the steps (which will be finite when used with the low-step
rules, i.e., it is well-founded) with the number of steps being k being 1 less than the total number of (possibly high) steps in the context of a
single low step, and our inductive hypothesis will be if I(PC(c)) ĹI I(Start(P0)) and,
Pr
[
I(PC(c ′)) ĹI I(Start(P0))

P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n );
P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
⟨c, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pk ⟨c ′,′,V′⟩
]
= 0
then,
Pr
[
I(PC(c ′′)) ĹI I(Start(P0))

P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n );
P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
⟨c, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pk ⟨c ′,,V⟩ ⇝pk+1 ⟨c ′′,′,V′⟩
]
= 0
The base case k = 0 is trivial as it is true by supposition.
For the inductive case, we now consider the derivation rule used for the k + 1’th step and show that it preserves the inductive hypothesis,
assuming it for the k’th step. We now perform a case analysis on the step used.
• Case Internal-Step:
In this derivation we have that:
internal step
c ′ −→ c ′′
⟨c ′,,V⟩ ⇝1 ⟨c ′′,′,V1⟩
By inspection of each of the LIO rules, the label is manipulated in the following ways:
– In Unlabel, the current label is joined with the level of the labeled value, so the flows relation between the current label and the
starting label is preserved.
– In Reset the label is returned to its original label. However, from the ToLabeled rule, the label is based on the current label. As a result,
since the label is based on a previous step’s current label, and the inductive hypothesis assumes it was true for that point, then the
label it is reset to is also satisfies the flow relation to the starting label.
– In all other rules, the current label is not changed, which by supposition satisfies the flow relation.
Proof on Low-Step relation↷p By induction on j.
• Base Case: j = 1: That is, we will prove the following:
Pr
[
I(PC(c)) ĹI I(Start(P0))

P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n );
P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c,,V⟩ ← stepPℓ (⟨Start(P),Clr(P) | t⟩,S, 1)
]
= 0
There are two cases we must consider in the low step relation, the Low-Step rule and the Low-to-High-to-Low-Step rule. In the Low-Step,
we must show that the inductive hypothesis holds after a single Clio step⇝p , and for the Low-to-High-to-Low-Step rule must hold for
many (finite) Clio steps⇝∗p . Note that the Low-Step rule is a special case of the Low-to-High-to-Low-Step rule so we only consider the
more general case of preserving the invariant across many steps. To show this, we appeal to the previous proof made to show that the
invariant is preserved across Clio steps. As a result, we have that:
Pr
[
I(PC(c ′)) ĹI I(Start(P0))

P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n );
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P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
⟨c, skip, Σ0⟩ ⇝p1 ...⇝pk ⟨c ′,,V⟩
]
= 0
From the previous proof on the single-step relation, we can conclude that I(PC(c)) ĹI I(Start(P0)). As a result, we satisfy the inductive
hypothesis.
• Inductive Case: j = k+1: That is, we will prove the following:
Pr
[
I(PC(c)) ĹI I(Start(P0))
 P ′ ← Gen(p˜, 1n );
P = P0 ⊎ P ′; ⟨c,,V⟩ ← stepPℓ (⟨Start(P),Clr(P) | t⟩,S,k + 1)
]
= 0
We can expand the step metafunction to be(⟨c ′′,′′,V′⟩,p · p′)
where(⟨c ′,,V⟩,p) ∈ stepP
ℓ
(c,S,k);
′ = S();
(⟨c ′,,V⟩,′)↷p′ ⟨c ′′,′′,V′⟩
The strategy on the stores does not affect the current label. After this adversary interaction, we can invoke the single-step lemma
result here to conclude that I(PC(c ′′)) ĹI I(Start(P0)). As a result, the inductive hypothesis is true.
With all cases accounted for in the low step relation, and the single-step relation, we can conclude the proof.
□
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B.5 Leveraged Forgery Security Proof
Definition B.10 (Values function). Define the Values function as follows:
ValuesP (put ‹b :l1› at vk · R) = put ‹b :l1› at vk · Values(R) if ‹(v,vk ,n) :l1› = deserializeP (R, ‹b :l1›,τ )
ValuesP (R · R) = Values(R) otherwise
Theorem B.11 (Existential forgery under chosen message attack). For all keystores P0, principals p in principal sets p˜, and j if Π is
secure against existential forgery under chosen message attacks, then
for all I(l2) ⊑I I(l1) ⊑I I(authorityOf(P0)) ∧ p,
Pr
[
‹b :l1› ∈ ValuesP (R′) and ‹b :l1› < ValuesP (R) P ′ ← Gen({p}, 1n ); P = P0 ⊎ P ′;
t ,S,A2 ← A(pub(P));
⟨c,,V⟩ ← stepP
ℓ
(⟨Start(P),Clr(P) | t⟩,S, j);
R ← ;
t ′,S′ ← A2(R);
⟨c ′,′,V′⟩ ← stepP
ℓ
(⟨Start(P0),Clr(P) | t ′⟩,S′, j);
R′ ← ′
]
is negligible in n.
Proof. We consider the level required to produce a valid signature during a store operation. The signature must be valid for a p ∈ p˜. By
inspection of the Clio semantics, the only way to a valid signature would occur in the interaction is during the store operation, which uses
the labeled value’s label, or by the strategy.
According to the store operation, current label must be bounded above by the label of the labeled value (i.e., lcur ⊑ l1). For integrity, this
means the current label’s integrity component I must be at least as trustworthy as the principal p.
By the previous lemma, we can conclude that the current integrity label will never be at a level I ′ such that
I ′ ĹI I(Start(P0))
This means that the level of the Clio computation would need to be at least
I = I(authorityOf(P0 ⊎ {p 7→ Gen(1n )}))
By unpacking the definition of Start(P ⊎ {p 7→ Gen(1n )}), this integrity label satisfies the following relation
I ĹI I(Start(P0))
Which we have shown is impossible to reach. As a result, the current label’s integrity level will never be at a level where it can sign the
value using p’s private signing key.
As a result, the only way a high integrity value could be in the challenge store σ ′ and not in the original store σ would require the
strategy to forge a signature itself without Clio’s assistance. Since this occurs with only negiglible probability, we have satisfied the proof
obligation. □
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C Implementation Details
In this section we discuss additional implementation details of our prototype.
C.1 Storing and Fetching
For each category used in the program we generate a symmetric key and two RSA key pairs: an encryption/decryption key pair and a
signing/verification key pair. This information is stored in the database after being asymmetrically encrypted and then signed as described
in Section 4.1. Category key generation relies on the RSA key pairs for each principal involved, which should be supplied by the user in the
form of an initial keystore when the Clio computation starts.
After the relevant IFC effects have been performed, storing a labeled value involves fetching the symmetric key for each category in its
confidentiality clause as well as the signature keys that correspond to each category in its integrity clause, potentially generating these on the
fly. The labeled value is serialized to a bitstring, then RSA-PSS signed by at least one principal per integrity category, and finally AES256-CTR
onion-encrypted using the symmetric key for each confidentiality category. Fetching involves the dual operations, i.e., symmetric decryption
and RSA-PSS signature verification.
In order to avoid problems with improperly escaped strings, we encode every bitstring in base64.
C.2 User API
Our library provides all the Clio operations described in the paper, plus a few extra functions that are necessary to glue Clio code with the
rest of the program. Here are some of the most important ones.
Clio code can be run using the evalCLIO function. This function takes two arguments: a record initialState of type CLIOState and a
Clio computationm. The record initialState provides initial values for the current label, the current clearance, the keystore, the version map
and the store label. The function simply establishes a connection with a Redis server and executesm using that database as the store and
initialState as the local state.
In order to generate keystores, we provide the utility function initializeKeyMapIO. This function takes a list of principals as argument,
and produces a keystore with fresh asymmetric key pairs for all of them. Our prototype does not provide means to store these keystores
beyond the execution of the program, but it would be straightforward for users to implement this functionality in their own programs, or
with their own PKI.
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